Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Mark Peaty writes:

SP: 'Getting back to the original question about teleportation experiments, are you saying that it would be impossible, or just technically very difficult to preserve personal identity whilst undergoing such a process? As Brent pointed out, technical difficulty is not an issue in thought experiments. , MP: I have answered this, in responding to Brent. In summary I say: if it is just A [any old] rendition of a human you want, then given that thought experiments allow that all practical challenges can be overcome, the answer is Yes! On the other hand if the strict requirement of an exact copy of a particular person is required to be output then it becomes a question of whether or not truly infinite computing power is required to calculate the changes occurring within the original at scan time. If it is then the answer is NO, because infinity is infinity. I think Derek Parfit's copier [Reasons and Persons Ch 10] was 'usually' producing complete and accurate copies, because one of his scenarios addresses what would happen if there was a fault in the transmission.

The brain manages to maintain identity from moment to moment without perfect copying or infinite computing power. Of course, you may need very good copying and very great computing power, but this is different in kind, not just in degree, from perfect copying and infinite computing power.

Stathis Papaioannou

And does it even have to be very good?  Suppose it made a sloppy copy of me that left out 
90% of my memories - would it still be "me"?  How much fidelity is required for 
Bruno's argument?  I think not much.

Brent Meeker

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