Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 3/18/07, *Jason* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>
> Every conscious perspective within the UD could be said to have some
> statistical measure in relation to other conscious perspectives.
> Which is to say, some experiences occur with a greater frequency than
> others. However, I am wondering if any useful conclusions can be made
> from this as Self Sampling Assumptions do.
> An argument that casts doubt on SSA's is: First, whatever measure an
> experience has, if it exists in the UD it has probability 1 of being
> experienced, regardless of how frequently or infrequently it occurs in
> the UD. Second, if two experiences are indistinguishable what/how/why
> does it matter if it is experienced one time or a million? How can an
> experience be given more "weight" by being more common within the UD?
> Is it meaningful to say an experience can be experienced multiple
> Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic
> communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The
> effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately
> explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past
> experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in the
> remembered order and in the remembered body.
It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an isolated, experience
of one thing and contrarily that it includes memories of past experiences.
That makes it a compound. If an OM can be such a compound then it can include
memory of which OM was immediately before it and OMs will form a chain (as
suggested by Bertrand Russell) and define mental "time". Under comp this chain
may branch (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't
include memory of a predecessor.
>Thus it is meaningless to
> speak of having the same experience multiple times: you only experience
> one thing at a time, and you can't remember experiencing multiple
> identical experiences, since if you could there would be something to
> distinguish them and they wouldn't be identical. However, the weighting
> of OMs *relative* to other OMs with the same time stamp and sense of
> identity is important in considering future expectations. If you undergo
> destructive teleportation with two copies appearing in London and one
> copy in Paris, you will subjectively have a 2/3 and 1/3 chance of
> finding yourself in London and Paris, respectively, after entering the
> sending station.
> A reason for believing SSA's is: If one considered an infinite set
> containing one instance of every distinguishable observer moment, more
> would contain disorded and illogical (talking white rabbit)
> experiences vs. what we would consider to be ordered and logical
> experiences. Consider just visual experiences, there are many more
> ways for a disordly almost random image (such as this
> http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a0/Tux_secure.jpg ) to be
> experienced than for a meaningful image (like your computer monitor
> infront of you) to be experienced.
> As you read and contemplate this post, you find yourself experiencing
> a rational universe and perspective. Is your experience now a rare
> abberation among the set of all possible experiences or is there
> something to be said for SSA's? SSA's would suggest most experiences
> are produced in universes that are stable and ordered enough for life
> to evolve, and therefore making completely illogical experiences
> highly unlikely (but not impossible as they could occur as the initial
> conditions of a program in the UD).
> Do most on this list believe there must be some statistical reason for
> the order of your current observer moment? Are self sampling
> assumptions necessary to rule out talking white rabbit experiences?
> The most common white rabbit universes in the UD will involve everything
> breaking up into noise, like your image cited above but not just for
> vision, and these will be eliminated not due to having a low measure
> (they will have a relatively much higher measure than orderly
> universes), but because they do not support observers. However, if there
> are multiple candidate successor OMs including ones with bizarre events
> happening, you should expect to experience the ones with higher measure.
> To deny this would be to deny the validity of probability theory.
> I'm not sure what you mean by "the order of your current observer moment".
> Stathis Papaioannou
> Stathis Papaioannou
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