Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
>     Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>      >
>      >
>      > On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>     <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>      > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>     <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>> wrote:
>      >
>      >
>      >      > Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in
>     telepathic
>      >      > communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or
>     not. The
>      >      > effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is
>     adequately
>      >      > explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past
>      >      > experiences need not have happened at all, let alone
>     happened in the
>      >      > remembered order and in the remembered body.
>      >
>      >     It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an
>     isolated,
>      >     experience of one thing and contrarily that it includes
>     memories of
>      >     past experiences.   That makes it a compound.  If an OM can
>     be such
>      >     a compound then it can include memory of which OM was
>     immediately
>      >     before it and OMs will form a chain (as suggested by Bertrand
>      >     Russell) and define mental "time".  Under comp this chain may
>     branch
>      >     (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't
>      >     include memory of a predecessor.
>      >
>      >
>      > The memories of past experiences are called real memories if they
>     arose
>      > in the usual causally linked fashion, in the same brain. However, in
>      > theory they could be false memories. There is no way to tell, from
>      > within a particular moment of experience, whether remembered moments
>      > occurred in the remembered order or even occurred at all in the
>     real world.
>      >
>      > Stathis Papaioannou
>     I understand that.  But if OMs are isolated, unitary experiences,
>     then there is no way to explain 'consistent continuation' as in
>     Bruno's comp.  OMs that don't happen to be remembering some other OM
>     are disconnected and are equally consistent and inconsistent with
>     any other OM.  They aren't able to create even the illusion of
>     continuity. 
> Sure: continuity is created by memory. 

But I don't see how.

>If there are OMs which don't 
> remember being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of 
> consciousness. 

There's the rub.  Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously remembering 
being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an *unconscious* memory 
component of an OM then there's a problem with what it means to have an 
unconscious part of consciousness.

Brent Meeker

>they might be part of someone else's stream of 
> consciousness, or just stand in isolation, with no future or past. I 
> imagine this is what it would be like in the end stages of dementia.
> Stathis Papaioannou
> > 

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