It's getting such and sucher - the multiple, back-and-forth gets dizzying.
So I will copy certain sentences of the "Stathistical" discussion for
reflection.-Below is the orig.Maze.
John
-------------------------------

> JM earlier: What else can we 'imagine'? Ideational -- of whom? Mine?
> Yours? I would not recite "of the universe" because HOW do we have access to
> a conscious process of the totality with our limited mind?
>

SP:"I don't quite understand this question. "

First: I corrected typos, but that will not solve the understandability. I
try to paraphrase the question, although that usually makes it even more
convoluted<G>:
I suppose, you imagine THAT computer to be 'above' our limited knowledge of
the human mind, (what we do not know in its entirety) to simulate it in 'all
conscious' aspect.
Maybe a 'consciousness of the totality of the entire universe?'  We can
'simulate' in a computer only the part we know of and that is insufficient
for representing "it all".  Of course we should not reduce our
'comp'-substrate to an Apple, IBM, or similar.
--------------------
"My "in principle" is somewhat narrower: I meant physically possible, given
the laws of our universe, without recourse to multiverses etc."

" Physically" - as in our imaginational (I almost wrote: figment)
reductionist science e.g. "Physics 101"? I mean: "material"? I don't know
about the 'laws' of the universes,
(I don't know how to restrict such from the other universes - if such exist)
- I know only
about those in-model-findings (see below) that produced the most match in
our limited ways of past observations/explanations and our 'science'
declared (and calculated) them "laws of physics". With new findings such
"laws" may change. Not the universe(s)
------------------------------------
"If we could model a hurricane on a computer...."

Here come the 'models'. Not the gorgeous chicks in skimpy clothes and NOT
the functional simulations of constructs for easier study/understanding,
(like to simulate a biological process by an electrical/mathematical
construct, etc.). I mentioned earlier and I paraphrase:
as I use the word (non-exclusively my way) it is a topical/functional
limitation of a part of the totality (a limited extract) for the
understanding and handling of our limited minds. A mental cut to our
capabilities. Of course it does not collapse buildings. In "my" model we
consider about a hurricane only what we know of, speed, geometry, pressure
etc., I wish we knew about more from beyond-our-model circumstances and
could so interfere with its occurrence, or even stop them.
Like our 'model' of the brain is tissue within the skull and no link to
ideational qualities,
personal topical thoughts, experiences - memories, which are all handled in
the churning of these tissues - (and maybe else, still to be found). They
are believed to be linked, some say: they are included in those (physical??)
measurements we use in the present practice. I consider such reductionist
science a pars pro toto.
A 'complete' version of (my type) model is the thing itself (Robert Rosen).
Had we such 'complete mode' available your 'zombie' would be a real person.
-------------------------------------
" You don't even need "science":
             and:
"for each part of the brain, a precise description of what happens when, for
example, a certain neurotransmitter is released into a certain synapse, will
allow you eventually to predict how the whole brain will behave, amazingly
difficult though that task would be. "

I accept the findings of our reductionist science with awe it is the only
and efficient way how we learn about the world. And the results are
astonishingly proliferous. I would add: in spite of our little understanding
what we are talking about. The edifice of 'science' is remarkable, with all
those "it must be", "it may be", "it is assumed" and "as postulated"  qualia
of very smart people. I seek a peek 'beyond', like some do it with
'numbers', some with UD, Multiverse, Q-science or religious faith.
That 'certain neurotransmitter into certain synapse' may explain many
processes, not exclusively though: given changes from other parts (in or
outside the skull) may alter the way how "the whole brain behaves" . We
think in a narrow window of the 'givens'
Reproducibility is usual within fixed model-framework, easily misunderstood
for the general processes. Matching experiments are designed and
quantitatively evaluated.
Engineered. Technology is an incredible model-achievement. Almost perfect. .

--------------------------
" I can't explain exactly how my computer works, but I that doesn't mean it
must contain magical processes.

This after the complexity of biological processes is IMO exaggerated.
(After the French aristocratic 'Academy's verdicts' that Stevenson's
locomotive will not move, just turn its wheels on the spot and Fulton's
impeller will just drill a hole in the water,  magical is what we cannot
explain as of today). Then came epistemic enrichment.
It's OK to postpone understanding, wrong is to force a (model-based)
solution upon 'things' exceeding the boundaries of the model (like: we know
the brain-tissue and its histological churning, so EVERYTHING we assign to
brain function is explainable by such 'data')
--------------------------------
"You build your model of the brain, then you test it to see if it behaves
like a real brain. If it doesn't, you go back and try to refine your model.
When you can't tell the difference between the model and the real brain you
have succeeded.

"Real brain"? according to our present (omniscient!) thinking?
Finding no difference?  Some success you deem. Remember, please, that
'model' in my vocabulary is the limited topical fraction of the total
interconnected 'thing' and we use it for practical reasons (which comes
already to the next remark)
-------------------------
"Do you acknowledge that there is a difference between the physically
impossible, and the merely practically impossible?

Since I consider 'physical' a 'practical explanatory mode': principally NO,
but you asked 'practically' as a sub-chapter of 'physical' and in this
respect I certainly do.
With my previous stance about 'everything' ('anything') possible (even if
not plausible or probable) I may resort to denying 'logically improper' as
impossible, however it may be false when using ONLY human logic.
--------------
"That's right; but are you suggesting that in addition to the physical
parts, there are other parts? "  with the added: ..."There is no evidence
for this"


I don't know about 'parts'  if they are not in our physical setup. I
consider the ideational or whatever 'features' in the totality as
inter-effective qualia unidentified today for our mind. Remember my slogan
"I dunno" (not academic tenure-stuff).
I consider an idea NOT as constructed by sub-idea components, which can be
interchanged into 'other' ideas. If I consider some 'comp' it is pure
analogue. I am not at the level to formulate a world on such principle. So
please, don't ask me.
To the added remark of yours: 'no evidence' is not 'evidence for no'.
 Ignorantia non est argumentum.
*
Sorry for being so verbose, I wanted to reflect to ALL your remarks and
wanted  to be more accommodating than it turned out to be. Sorry.

John




On 3/31/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/31/07, John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:
>
> The non-standard part of Bruno's comp, as I see it, is to accept that
> > > computation can lead to thought but to reject the physical supervenience
> > > theory, i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to
> > > take place in order to "happen". But that question aside, computationalism
> > > depends on the idea that (a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce 
> > > all
> > > the physical processes in our brain using a computer, to an arbitrary 
> > > degree
> > > of precision, and (b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a
> > > functionally identical brain, also yields a functionally identical mind -
> > > i.e., as opposed to a zombie. Roger Penrose says that (a) is false;
> > > John Searle and religious people say that even if (a) is true, (b) is 
> > > false.
> > > I tend to think that (a) and (b) are both true, but I am not completely
> > > sure.
> > >
> > Here we go:
> > i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to take place
> > in order to "happen".
> >  What else can we 'imagine'? Ideationa -- of whom? Mine? Yours? I wouild
> > not recite "of the unioverse" because HOW do we have access to a conscious
> > process of the totality with our limited mind?
> >
>
> I don't quite understand this question.
>
>  ...(a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all the physical
> > processes in our brain using a computer,...
> > In principle EVERYTHING is possible. Look at the discussions on this
> > list.
> >
>
> My "in principle" is somewhat narrower: I meant physically possible, given
> the laws of our universe, without recourse to multiverses etc.
>
> ...(b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a functionally
> > identical brain,...
> > If a 'model' is identical in all respects ("functionally") it is not a
> > model, it is the THING itself. So we are in this case playing withg words.
> > NOTHING can be completely identical in this world, because everything is the
> > product of ALL the actual circumstances co- functioning in the construction
> > of the 'thing' (process). And ALL the circumstances do not ever repeat
> > themselves identically: it would be a merrygoround world loop what we so far
> > did not experience. We can find similarity in ALL aspects we observe, but
> > that does not include the complete totality. We like to call such similarity
> > an 'identity'..
> > .So I do not argue against your finding a) and b) possible, but does it
> > make sense?
> >
>
> If we could model a hurricane on a computer the simulation would not
> destroy houses, but if the model were good enough it would tell us which
> houses a real hurricane would destroy. Similarly, if we could model a brain,
> we would be in a position to know how a person would behave in a given
> situation. We could use the computer model to control the person's muscles
> and no-one would realise he wasn't a "real" person, i.e. we would have at
> least a zombie.
>
>  2. Replaced? meaning one takes out that goo of neurons, proteins and
> > > > other tissue-stuff with its blood suply and replace the cavity (no 
> > > > matter
> > > > how bigger or smaller) by a (watch it): *digital* computer, 
> > > > "appropriately
> > > > configured" and electric flow in it. For the quale-details see the par 
> > > > #1.
> > > >
> > > > Each neuron is made up of macromolecules in a watery medium. The
> > > macromolecules follow the laws of physics: there are equations which
> > > describe how phospholipid bilayers form membranes, how proteins embedded 
> > > in
> > > these membranes change conformation when ligands bind to them, how these
> > > conformation changes result in ion fluxes and changes in transmembrane
> > > potential, and so on. So if you ignore for the moment the technical
> > > difficulties involved in working all this out and implementing it, it 
> > > should
> > > be possible to program a computer to behave just like a biological brain,
> > > receiving afferent impulses from sense organs and sending afferent 
> > > impulses
> > > to muscles, which would result in a being whose behaviour is
> > > indistinguishable from that of an intact human. The only way around this
> > > conclusion is if the behaviour of the brain depends on physical processes
> > > which are not computable, like Penrose's postulated quantum gravity 
> > > effects.
> > > This is possible, but there isn't really any good evidence supporting it, 
> > > as
> > > far as I'm aware.
> > >
> >
> > 3-29 insert s:
> > ...The macromolecules follow the laws of physics:...
> > NONONONONO!  Certain experiences with macromolecules are described in
> > our incompletge views as being described by certain (statistical?
> > probabilistic?) findings in the physical domain. Macro- or
> > nonmacromolecules, atoms, their parts, show behavior in our 'slanted',
> > 'partial'. observation which have been matched to calculations drawn upon
> > similarly era-restricted observational explanatory calculations (physics). I
> > did not work with atoms or molecules, when I made my macromo;leculs and
> > their applications. I worked with masses that behaved. Then I put them into
> > a reductionist analysis and tried to 'match' the numerical data to those in
> > the books. I made 'bilayers', 'ligands'. Indeed I got responses which I
> > described as performing as expected. And got the patents.
> >
>
> But you wouldn't have been granted the patents if your experiments were
> not repeatable. You don't even need "science": a precise description of what
> happens when you mix substance A with substance B under physical conditions
> C will suffice. Similarly, for each part of the brain, a precise description
> of what happens when, for example, a certain neurotransmitter is released
> into a certain synapse, will allow you eventually to predict how the whole
> brain will behave, amazingly difficult though that task would be.
>
> ...it should be possible to program a computer to behave just like a
> > biological brain,...
> > How does a 'biological brain' work? we - so far - extracted some
> > behavioral deductions into the model we have about the goo-in-the-skull and
> > call it a "total" - even with those unknown parts which come from outside
> > the matter-reactions we have access to - or even from so far undiscovered
> > aspects/factors. And I would not call it "biological" which is a limited
> > model of the functionality. One difficulty is the baggage in the words we
> > are restrict to in our historically developed language.
> >
>
> With all the scrutiny, there would be some evidence of behaviour in the
> brain that biochemistry cannot explain. There isn't, any more than there is
> for any other organ in the body. Certainly there are many things in biology
> that we can't yet explain, but the sheer complexity of the biochemical
> processes makes this inevitable. I can't explain exactly how my computer
> works, but I that doesn't mean it must contain magical processes.
>
> ... it should be possible ...
> > Amen. It should. I would be happy. (But, alas, it isn't)
> > ... indistinguishable from that of an intact human....
> > looks to me like the right sentence, just let it be known by what
> > model-characteristics (qualia) do we distinguish? Or 'can' we distinguish. 
> > In
> > what respect? First: Do we KNOW all details of an 'infact human' full
> > process? I think we know only a part of it, the oneS which ARE accessible to
> > our presently applied observational power and knowledge base. Just compare
> > to the 'infact' human as described in 1000AD or 3000BC. etc. - not in
> > 2300AD.
> >
>
> You build your model of the brain, then you test it to see if it behaves
> like a real brain. If it doesn't, you go back and try to refine your model.
> When you can't tell the difference between the model and the real brain you
> have succeeded.
>
> ...if you ignore for the moment the technical difficulties involved in
> > working all this out and implementing it,
> > in other words it is impossible, but we can think about it. No, in my
> > practical thinking only the possible (everything though it may be) is
> > usable, not input of which we presume that it is not feasible (possible?).
> > The difficulties are not 'technical', they are ontological. Not fitting into
> > circumstances we 'even suppose' .
> >
>
> Do you acknowledge that there is a difference between the physically
> impossible, and the merely practically impossible?
>
> >  3. "you" - and who should that be? can we separate our living
> > > > brain (I mean with all its functionality) from 'YOU', the self, the
> > > > person, or call it the simulacron of yourself? What's left? Is there 
> > > > "me"
> > > > and "my brain"? As I like to call it: the brain is the 'tool' of my
> > > > mind, mind is pretty unidentified,  but - is close to my-self, some 
> > > > call it
> > > > life, some consciousness, - those items we like to argue about because 
> > > > none
> > > > of us knows what we are talking about (some DO THINK they know, but only
> > > > something and for themselves).
> > > >
> > > >
> > > I find it hard to define consciousness, but I know what it is, and so
> > > does everyone who has it.
> > >
> >
> > And everyone (not really) knows it personalized and differently.
> > Scholars: slanted to their theoretical needs, others maybe to their
> > emotions.
> >
> >  4. "feel" ----????---- who/what? the transistors?
> > > > (Let me repeat: I am not talking about Transistor Stathis).
> > > >
> > > >
> > > You could equally well ask, do the proteins/ phospholipids/ nucleic
> > > acids etc. feel? Apparently, they do. If your brain stops working or
> > > is seriously damaged, you stop feeling.
> > >
> >
> > I am not speaking about how 'parts' feel, rather how the complexity
> > acts. The brain is a tool cooperating in our mental factor, so if the tool
> > is damaged certain activities of it may be missing, or perform
> > inadequately.
> >
>
> That's right; but are you suggesting that in addition to the physical
> parts, there are other parts? That is, that even though a brain is perfectly
> intact physically and seems to be functioning normally to an outside
> observer, it might yet not be conscious because it lacks some non-physical
> component, such as a soul? There is no evidence for this.
>
> >  *-SP:
> > > > Bruno goes on to show that this entails there is no separate
> > > > physical reality by means of the UDA, but we can still talk about
> > > > computationalism - the predominant theory in cognitive science - without
> > > > discussing the UDA. And in any case, the ideas Brent and I have been
> > > > discussing are still relevant if computationalism is wrong and (again a
> > > > separate matter) there is only one universe.
> > > > Stathis Papaioannou-*
> > > >
> > > > <JM>
> > > > Yes, "we today" KNOW about only 1 universe. But we believe in a
> > > > physical reality what we 'feel', 'live it' and hold as our 'truth' as 
> > > > well.
> > > > Even those 'more advanced' minds saying they don't believe in it, cry 
> > > > out
> > > > (OMIGOD!) when "Dr. Johnson's stone" hurts their toe in the shoe.
> > > >
> > > > I like to draw comparisons between "what we know today" and what we
> > > > knew 1000, 3000, or 5000 years ago and ask: what will we 'know' just 500
> > > > years ahead in the future by a continuing epistemic enrichment? (If 
> > > > humanity
> > > > survives that long).
> > > > Please, readers, just list the answers alphabetically.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > I don't know the answer. Maybe next year there will be some discovery
> > > which will have us all laughing at the idea that computers can be 
> > > conscious,
> > > but at present we can only go on the information available to us, and try 
> > > to
> > > keep an open mind.
> > >
> >
> > Stathis, I may cross my fingers, but would not hold my breath. IMO we
> > 'know' a little part, the unknown may be the essential and overwhelming.
> > Good luck to humanity to become smarter before extinct.
> >
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
>
>

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