On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On May 9, 5:57 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >> How can Everett's "every possibility is realized" be logically compatible 
> >> with Bohm's "there's only one, deterministic outcome", we just don't know 
> >> which one" and Griffith's "it's a probabilistic theory so some things 
> >> happen and some don't".  I can hardly imagine less compatible 
> >> interpretations of the same mathematics.  I could add Cramer's 
> >> transactional interpretation and Feynmann's zig-zag in time 
> >> interpretation.  Are all those maps or territories?
> > Well of course the ontological details are indeed quite incompatible.
> > The status of QM is still very much 'in the air' at the moment, so we
> > don't yet know with any degree of certainty.  But that can (and
> > should) change once both theory and observation progresses in the
> > future.
> And will reality change too - or is reality different from theories that 
> describe it?

Of course reality doesn't change.  The question of map versus
territory is *not* an all or nothing
question.  *sometimes* the map equals the territory.  Most of the time
it does not.

> But according to your "map=territory" philosophy all these incompatible 
> theories exist physically.  What does that mean?  All but one of them must 
> describe some other universe and we just don't know which ones?  Or do you 
> mean they "exist physically" as representational tokens in the brains of 
> physicists?  They certainly don't exist like tables and chairs.
> Brent Meeker-

To say that map=territory always would obviously be absurd.  Only in
the case of the parts of our theories which are *correct* does the map
equal the territory.  When our theories are wrong, these theories are
quite different to reality and certainly don't physically exist ;)
The fact that we can't know for sure which parts of our theories are
wrong and which are right isn't a problem.

Most of the time the map is not the territory.  But for *some*
concepts (correct concepts!) it is.

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