Le 12-juil.-07, à 16:27, David Nyman a écrit :

> On 12/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> I try to avoid the words like "reflexive" or "reflection" in informal
>> talk, because it is a tricky technical terms
>> I tend to agree with what Brent said.
> Yes, I ended up more or less agreeing with him myself.  But I
> nevertheless feel, from their posts, that this is *not* what some
> people have in mind when they use the term 'exists'.

"existence" is a very very tricky notion. In the theory I am proposing 
(actually I derived it from the comp principle) the most basic notion 
of "exists" is remarkably well formalize by first order arithmetical 
logic, like in Ex(prime(x)):   it exists a prime number.
All other notion of "existence" are modal variant: like 
B[Ex(prime(x))], or ExB(prime(x)); I believe there is a prime number, 
there is a number such that I believe that that number is prime, etc. 
Of course, in the lobian frame, "B" refers itself to an arithmetical 
predicate (the "Beweisbar of Godel 1931).

>> I'm afraid
>> that sometimes you are near the 1004 fallacy.
> That may well be, but unfortunately I tend only to discover specific
> examples of this by trial and error.  But having done so, I try to
> hold on to the discovery.


>> But of course
>> your intuition grew perhaps from non comp or non lobian origin.
> That's definitely the case.

OK. (except that you are perhaps lobian, just not knowing it).

>> (I see now what could be the comp lobian "observer moments", and will
>> say more in a special purpose post.
> I look forward to it.

Thanks. I will do that in august, if you don't mind; it asks for some 
work. It will be related to the content of my next paper, where I 
currently think I will use the "observer moment" notion (and refer to 
the list). Roughly speaking, I think that we have to consider first 
person and third person notion of OM. Nick Bostrom original one is 
clearly a notion of 1-OM.
I can show that with comp there is a natural notion of 3-OM, which is 
just the (true) Sigma1 sentence. They correspond to the accessible 
states of the Universal Dovetailer, or to the theorem of a Robinsonian 
machine or universal machine.
A universal machine (or person) get Lobian when she knows (in a 
technically rather weak sense) that she is universal. This makes it 
possible (well, even necessary) for the machine to distinguish the 3-OM 
with all possible 1-OM notion, and this can accelerate the derivation 
of the physical laws from numbers/machines relations. The new and key 
point is the identification of 3-OM directly with Sigma1 sentences.

>> Coming back from Siena, I know now that all my work on Church thesis 
>> is
>> more original than I thought (meaning: I have to publish more before
>> even logician grasp the whole thing ...).
> You have a hard row to plough!

The difficulty is the interdisciplinary overlap of quantum physics, 
mathematical logic and, perhaps the harder part: philosophy or 

>> Is "us" = to the lobian machine?
> I just meant observers in general, using myself as the model.
>>> and I've been trying to convince Torgny
>>> that we shouldn't fool ourselves into mistaking such conceptions for
>>> modes of existing.
>> But each point of view (hypostasis) defines its own "mode of
>> existence". Now Plotinus restricts the notion of existence for the
>> ideas (here: the effective objects which provably exist in Platonia).
>> That is why both God and Matter does not really exist in Plotinus
>> theory. Of course God and Matter do exist, even for Plotinus, but it 
>> is
>> a different mode of existence.
> I'm frustrated that I don't seem to be able to communicate what I mean
> here (I don't know if this is an example of 1004 or not).  I meant
> that just because we can imagine something in a gods' eye way doesn't
> (for me) entail that it exists in any other way - what I called (but
> I'll desist!) 'reflexively' (i.e. with reference to itself, or just:
> for itself), which Brent was content to call existence simpliciter.
> This intuition of course just begins with knowing that *I* exist for
> myself, which implies that others exist for themselves, which
> ultimately implies that everything exists for itself - 'the One' being
> the ultimate expression of this.  I don't mean to equate 'exists for
> itself' with consciousness, but to say that consciousness emerges as a
> complex aspect of such self-relation.  I'm convinced both that you
> know what I mean by this, and also that it can be expressed in the
> Lobian discourse (though not by me).

Perhaps. The problem here is that I should explain technical things 
just to help you to figure out the complexity of the point you single 
out. To translate this in the lobian discourse is less easy than you 
think. More on this in august.

>>> 'The One' is also a mode of enquiry (no less tricky, of course): it
>>> seems to suggest that the mode of existing of both the qualia and the
>>> quanta may be ineliminably reflexive: the splintering of a singular
>>> process of self-reflexion.
>> ?
> That was just another way of putting what I said above: IOW, that
> everything is a relativisation of the One, - i.e. the primary
> existent-for-itself.  I see now that my '1004 fallacy' is just that
> when I'm not sure I've been understood, I try to say it another way.
> But this is confusing.  I see the value of your sticking to your
> methodology, but then the problem for the generalist is that he has to
> work very hard to follow you.  But that of course is my problem not
> yours.

Making myself, or the lobian discourse, clear is also part of my 
problem, to be sure ...

You are right: 3 explanations can help, a 4th one could be too much ...

>>> Self: because there is no other;
>> ?
>>> reflexion: because there is no other relation.
>> ?
> Another example of (over)precision perhaps.  I sometimes think a lot
> of time could be saved if some of these dialogues took place in the
> same room!  I just meant that, given that all existence-for-itself
> derives from relativisation of the One, the notion of 'other' itself
> becomes relative (i.e. everything is really just an aspect of the One:
> there is no 'other' in any absolute sense).

I would say that being oneself, is absolute from a first person pov, 
but relative from a third person pov.

> Consequently, all
> relations are relations of the One with itself: i.e. self-relations.
> The reason I thought this might be important, originally, is that ISTM
> that it had a fundamental relevance to mind-body issues.  I felt that
> the whole 'dualist' problem came from not seeing this.  Dualism is
> clearly not relevant when everything is an aspect of the One, so that
> the relations which constitute both mind and matter are
> self-relations.

I'm happy you say so.

> I said in an earlier post that this amounted to a kind of solipsism of
> the One: IOW, the One would be justified in the view (if it had one!)
> that it was all that existed, and that everything was simply an aspect
> of itself.

Yes, and this is where Aristotle and Plotinus differs the most (even 
more than Aristotle/Plato). Would the ONE have a pov, He/She/It would 
be solispsist. A sad thing for a "God" ....



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