On 10/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> OK. Have you seen that this is going to made physics a branch of
> "intensional number theory", by which I mean number theory from the
> points of view of number ... ?

Insofar as we accept that the foundation of 'comp reality' is the
number realm, comp physics must indeed be a branch of this (e.g. as
per my previous example of 'digital digestion').

> OK. Don't buy it if you decide to buy only one book on Godel, and let
> me think which is the best one. But if you are willing to buy/read two
> books, then get it asap.

'In for a penny, in for a pound' (old English saying) - I've ordered a
cheap(ish) copy of Franzen on Godel.  But let me know which you think
is the best one.

> > I think we may have to come back later to this question of subjective
> > time.  But for now I rely on you to set the agenda of our more
> > structured modus operandi.
>
>
> Ok thanks.

Then for the rest, I'll wait for your next post.

David

>
>
> Le 10-août-07, à 14:26, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> >
> > On 09/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >> I hope you will not mind if I ask you "stupid" question, like "Do you
> >> know what mathematicians mean by "function?".
> >> Sometimes I realize that some people does not grasp what I say because
> >> they just miss some elementary vocabulary, or they have a problem with
> >> the notation.
> >> Of course anyone can ask any questions. Math is something easy (the
> >> easiest of all sciences) but if you miss a definition then it *looks*
> >> difficult.
> >
> > Thank you for asking, it's very important to ensure full understanding
> > at all points.  My maths are indeed a bit rusty, but fortunately
> > resources are easily available as needed to refresh the memory.  Would
> > you be happy with the wikipedia treatment of 'function'?
> >
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_function
>
>
> It is ok. I will say more in a post on the difference between the
> layman and the logician.
>
>
> >
> >> OK. But for this I need to be sure you grasp well the UD argument, at
> >> least the seven first step. The steps will always refer to the 8-steps
> >> presentation of the summary PDF Slides available here:
> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/
> >> SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
> >
> > How can I best demonstrate this to your satisfaction?  I accept the
> > validity of the demonstration in the UDA (which I believe that I'd
> > already intuited as a consequence of the 'solipsism of the One') that
> > the first person or reflexive OM must be indeterminate with respect to
> > its third person manifestations.
>
>
> OK. Have you seen that this is going to made physics a branch of
> "intensional number theory", by which I mean number theory from the
> points of view of number ... ?
>
>
> >  However, I also wanted to ask
> > whether it was important in this context to define in detail the
> > content and informational limits of a given OM (e.g. its temporal
> > scope or 'duration')?
>
>
> ? The third person OM are outside time and space. time and space will
> emerge from the way OMs combine each other. They do combine through
> their intrinsic relative content eventually. But here we are
> anticipating.
>
>
>
>
> >
> >> Well, the UDA can already be seen as a 'grandmother' way of making
> >> this
> >> intuitive. What you have to understand is the turing-universality of
> >> addition and multiplication, in the first order logic framework. I
> >> will
> >> explain this in all detail, but I have to begin with Church thesis. I
> >> propose we try to organize ourself through a well defined sequence of
> >> posts, which we can from time to time transform into a pdf, so that we
> >> can refer to the pages of that pdf, instead of post messages with
> >> fragile addresses. OK?
> >
> > OK indeed.
> >
> >> Peter was putting too much philosophical weight to the notion of
> >> existence. Recall that the "ontic base of reality" will just be te
> >> numbers, and that when I say a number exist, I mean it in the usual
> >> sense of elementary high school arithmetic. The key point is that a
> >> machine which can prove all the true sigma1-sentence is turing
> >> universal. this is already well explained in Torkel Franzen's book (in
> >> his first appendix).  Again, don't worry I will explain.
> >
> > Do I need Franzen's book too?
>
>
> Hmmm.... The problem with the logicians is that they have a tendency to
> write beautiful books (and often quite expensive).
> So yes, buy or find an exemplar of Franzen's book, but honestly I could
> mention some other good book. But in our context Franzen's book could
> be a good if not the best beginning. His other book on inexhaustibility
> is quite interesting too, even as an introduction to PA (the
> Escherichia Coli of the "lobian machine").
> OK. Don't buy it if you decide to buy only one book on Godel, and let
> me think which is the best one. But if you are willing to buy/read two
> books, then get it asap.
>
>
> >
> >> Now, to
> >> eliminate redundancy in the explanations, I insist we organize
> >> ourself.
> >> I have already explain many of those things, but never in a way so
> >> that
> >> I can easily refer to the (too many) posts. All right?
> >
> > Alright!
> >
> >> The idea is really this: if you are in front of a running (and thus
> >> never stopping UD), the seven steps shows that, taking comp seriously,
> >> to make any 100% prediction, you have to take into account all the
> >> reconstitutions of yourself (which exist by the comp hyp) and their
> >> continuations.
> >
> > OK, again in terms of 'the One', since all the 'reconstitutions'
> > exist, they must all indeed play a role in the 'account' (which can be
> > synonymous with narrative or story).
>
>
> Here there is something not quite correct I think. But I must go. The
> idea is that "all the reconsititution exist in many histories" will
> have just a statitistical effect of the first person view of the way
> the OM (re)combine. Again this is a (grandmother) anticipation.
>
>
>
> >
> >> By the first person indeterminacy, your future will be determined by
> >> the most probable comp histories going through your actual state.
> >
> > By 'probable' you refer to the elusive measure?
>
>
> The not so much elusive measure :)    Yes.
>
>
>
> >
> >> The problem then will consist in defining what is a "probable comp
> >> history". This is a very difficult problem: for example, when can we
> >> say that two computations are equivalent, etc.
> >
> > i.e. from the third person pov?
>
> Yes. Together with the impact for the other views.
>
>
>
> >
> >> The trick I have done is to abandon the idea of searching directly a
> >> measure on the computations, and, instead, to isolate the mathematical
> >> structure for the "certain-propositions" by using the self-referential
> >> logics.
> >
> > IOW you adopt the view from the inside out?  I would like to
> > understand this securely.  It seems to me that you're saying that
> > focusing on self-reference relies on the intrinsic self-location of
> > first person 'pages' within the 'Library of Babel' of the UD's output.
> >  Given this, how do such pages then 'cohere' into 'narratives through
> > time'?
>
>
> It is the other way round. It is from the logico-arithmetical coherence
> of the OMs that the subjective first person feeling of time (and
> irreversibility) will emerge. But this is what I have to show you
> (again, this is an anticipation).
>
>
>
>
> >
> >> The first person will feel herself restricted 'in time' indeed.
> >> Somehow, she creates subjective time/consciousness. But from the ontic
> >> view, with the "block-all-computations" (alias UD*) there is no time.
> >>  From the material (first person plural view) pov, it is an open
> >> problem
> >> if there is an "objective time".
> >
> > I think we may have to come back later to this question of subjective
> > time.  But for now I rely on you to set the agenda of our more
> > structured modus operandi.
>
>
> Ok thanks.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
> >
>

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