Youness Ayaita wrote: ... > 3 No-justification > > The no-justification is the most satisfying justification for the > Everything ensemble I know. I even think that a more satisfying > justification is impossible in principle. So what is it about? The > crucial point is to try to get to the bottom of our understanding of > 'existence'. In our everyday theory we use 'existence' as a property: > Some things 'exist', whereas other (imaginable) things don't. The > origin of this practice lies in very pragmatic reasons. It makes sense > to separate things that are 'accessible in principle' from things that > are not. This relation between 'us' and 'things which are accessible > in principle for us' was falsely understood as an objective property > of those things. I feel Wittgenstein's hands slapping on my back when > I tell you that 'existence' is nothing else than a linguistic > confusion. Strictly speaking, the concept of 'existence' doesn't make > sense. I encourage you to abandon it. If we take the right point of > view, the problem of having to find a "theory of everything" doesn't > occur. > > The amazing result of these simple considerations is that we get the > Everything ensemble gratis! We don't need any postulate. But how is > this transition made? At this point I remind you of the second section > of this article: The Everything ensemble, or the statement that > everything exists, is the interpretation of our new perspective in the > everyday theory. In our everyday theory, we use the concept of > 'existence' as a property of things. A property p is given by the > ensemble of (imaginable) things that have that property. Thus we can > identify the property p with the ensemble of (imaginable) things > having that property. > > The no-justification argues that it doesn't make sense to introduce > 'existence' as a property, or expressed in another way, that it is not > possible to meaningfully separate (imaginable) things that have the > (hypothetic) property that they 'exist' from (imaginable) things > without that property. This leaves us with two options if we still > want to use the concept of existence given by the everyday theory: > that the ensemble of (imaginable) things is empty or that every > (imaginable) thing has the property that it exists. The property is > degenerate, it does not separate some (imaginable) things from others. > Since, in our everyday theory, we say that things surrounding us > exist, we must consequently take the second option: that every > (imaginable) thing has the property that it exists. This is the > Everything ensemble. I repeat that the statement "everything exists" > can be seen as a definition of the new (and degenerate!) property of > existence: for an imaginable thing, to exist doesn't mean anything > else than being an imaginable thing. From our new perspective, it's a > tautology. But it is the interpretation of the new perspective in the > everyday theory. > > In this last paragraph it can be seen that the no-justification has a > lot in common with the zero information principle. I wrote that, if we > want to introduce the property of existence, than this property must > be degenerate (given by no entity or given by the ensemble of all > entities). In other words, there cannot be any information separating > some entities that exist from other entities that don't.
OK. So where are the flying pigs? Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
