Youness Ayaita wrote:
> 3 No-justification
> The no-justification is the most satisfying justification for the
> Everything ensemble I know. I even think that a more satisfying
> justification is impossible in principle. So what is it about? The
> crucial point is to try to get to the bottom of our understanding of
> 'existence'. In our everyday theory we use 'existence' as a property:
> Some things 'exist', whereas other (imaginable) things don't. The
> origin of this practice lies in very pragmatic reasons. It makes sense
> to separate things that are 'accessible in principle' from things that
> are not. This relation between 'us' and 'things which are accessible
> in principle for us' was falsely understood as an objective property
> of those things. I feel Wittgenstein's hands slapping on my back when
> I tell you that 'existence' is nothing else than a linguistic
> confusion. Strictly speaking, the concept of 'existence' doesn't make
> sense. I encourage you to abandon it. If we take the right point of
> view, the problem of having to find a "theory of everything" doesn't
> occur.
> The amazing result of these simple considerations is that we get the
> Everything ensemble gratis! We don't need any postulate. But how is
> this transition made? At this point I remind you of the second section
> of this article: The Everything ensemble, or the statement that
> everything exists, is the interpretation of our new perspective in the
> everyday theory. In our everyday theory, we use the concept of
> 'existence' as a property of things. A property p is given by the
> ensemble of (imaginable) things that have that property. Thus we can
> identify the property p with the ensemble of (imaginable) things
> having that property.
> The no-justification argues that it doesn't make sense to introduce
> 'existence' as a property, or expressed in another way, that it is not
> possible to meaningfully separate (imaginable) things that have the
> (hypothetic) property that they 'exist' from (imaginable) things
> without that property. This leaves us with two options if we still
> want to use the concept of existence given by the everyday theory:
> that the ensemble of (imaginable) things is empty or that every
> (imaginable) thing has the property that it exists. The property is
> degenerate, it does not separate some (imaginable) things from others.
> Since, in our everyday theory, we say that things surrounding us
> exist, we must consequently take the second option: that every
> (imaginable) thing has the property that it exists. This is the
> Everything ensemble. I repeat that the statement "everything exists"
> can be seen as a definition of the new (and degenerate!) property of
> existence: for an imaginable thing, to exist doesn't mean anything
> else than being an  imaginable thing. From our new perspective, it's a
> tautology. But it is the interpretation of the new perspective in the
> everyday theory.
> In this last paragraph it can be seen that the no-justification has a
> lot in common with the zero information principle. I wrote that, if we
> want to introduce the property of existence, than this property must
> be degenerate (given by no entity or given by the ensemble of all
> entities). In other words, there cannot be any information separating
> some entities that exist from other entities that don't.

OK.  So where are the flying pigs?

Brent Meeker

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