On 13 Sep, 12:47, Youness Ayaita <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 13 Sep., 13:26, 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 12 Sep, 01:50, Youness Ayaita <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
> > > The amazing result of these simple considerations is that we get the
> > > Everything ensemble gratis! We don't need any postulate. But how is
> > > this transition made? At this point I remind you of the second section
> > > of this article: The Everything ensemble, or the statement that
> > > everything exists, is the interpretation of our new perspective in the
> > > everyday theory. In our everyday theory, we use the concept of
> > > 'existence' as a property of things. A property p is given by the
> > > ensemble of (imaginable) things that have that property. Thus we can
> > > identify the property p with the ensemble of (imaginable) things
> > > having that property.
>
> > That isn't how properties are defined, and existence isn't a (first
> > order) property.
> > We place things into ensembles (classes, as opposed to sets) on the
> > basis of their properties;
> > we don't read properties off from ensembles. Properties have to come
> > first, or we would not
> > be able to classify individuals that we had not encountered before.
>
> I see two perfectly equivalent ways to define a property. This is
> somehow analogous to the mathematical definition of a function f: Of
> course, in order to practically decide which image f(x) is assigned to
> a preimage x, we usually must know a formula first. But the function f
> is not changed if I do not consider the formula, but the whole set
> {(x,f(x))} instead, where x runs over all preimages.

But that doesn't correspond to any realistic epistemology.
We are have no acquaintance with the entirety of set-of-all-red-
things.
You ha

> Concerning properties, we normally have some procedure to define which
> imaginable thing has that property.

We define imaginable things through hypothetical combinations
of properties -- eg "flying" + "pig"

> But I can change my perspective
> and think of the property as being the set of imaginable things having
> the property.

"As having *what* property?"
"The property that everything in *this* set has"
"What set? Show it to me!"

See the problem?

>This is how David Lewis defines properties (e.g. in his
> book "On the Plurality of Worlds").
>
> If you insist on the difference between the two definitions, you may
> call your property "property1" and Lewis's property "property2".


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