Youness Ayaita writes:
> It's a very trivial fact though that the two approaches are not
> equivalent. Nonetheless it's interesting to note it. I argue that we
> have good reasons to discard the second approach. The fundamental role
> will be assigned to the physical worlds (hence the title of this
> message). The difference between the two approaches leads to different
> expections to the question "What will I experience next?".
> Consequently it can be measured empirically. We find this result by
> observing that different physical worlds may produce the same observer
> moment (e.g. if the physical worlds differ in a detail not perceivable
> by the observer). This assigns a higher probability to the observer
> moment when chosen randomly in order to answer the question (it's
> multiply counted because it appears more than once in the everyting
> ensemble). Opposed to this, every observer moment (in the RSSA within
> a given reference class) would have an equal probability to be
> selected if we used the second approach.

I don't see why taking OMs as primary implies that they would all have
equal probability. If two physical worlds instantiate the same OM,
that may cause the OM to have higher measure. In the UDASSA model that
I prefer, OM measure is essentially the sum of the measures of all
programs that output that OM. If two universes instantiate it, both
contribute measure to it (as do "Boltzmann brains", demons with boxes,
Matrixes and other simulators, etc.).

Hal Finney

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