Le 28-nov.-07, à 05:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> On Nov 28, 3:16 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Le 27-nov.-07, à 05:47, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>>> Geometric properties cannot be derived from
>>> informational properties.
>> I don't see why. Above all, this would make the computationalist
>> or at least some step in the UDA wrong (but then which one?).
> I'll find the flaw in UDA in due course ;)
>> I recall that there is an argument (UDA) showing that if comp is true,
>> then not only geometry, but physics, has to be derived exclusively
>> numbers and from what numbers can prove (and know, and observe, and
>> bet, ...) about themselves, that is from both extensional and
>> intensional number theory.
>> The UDA shows *why* physics *has to* be derived from numbers (assuming
>> CT + "yes doctor").
>> The Lobian interview explains (or should explain, if you have not yet
>> grasp the point) *how* to do that.
> If the UDA is sound that would certainly refute what I'm claiming
> I want to see how physics (which as far I'm concerned *is*
> geometry - at least I think pure physics=geometry) emerges *purely*
> from theories of sets/numbers/categories.
OK. Note that UDA says only why, not how.
"how" is given by the lobian interview, and gives only the
"propositional physics" (as part
of the propositional "theology").
> I base my claims on ontological considerations (5 years of deep
> thought about ontology), which lead me to strongly suspect the
> irreducible property dualism between physical and mathematical
> properties. Thus I'm highly skeptical of UDA but have yet to property
> study it. Lacking resources to do proper study here at the
> moment.... :-(
We are in the same boat ...
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