Le 28-nov.-07, à 05:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :

> > > > On Nov 28, 3:16 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Le 27-nov.-07, à 05:47, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : >> >>> Geometric properties cannot be derived from >>> informational properties. >> >> I don't see why. Above all, this would make the computationalist >> wrong, >> or at least some step in the UDA wrong (but then which one?). > > I'll find the flaw in UDA in due course ;) Thanks. > >> I recall that there is an argument (UDA) showing that if comp is true, >> then not only geometry, but physics, has to be derived exclusively >> from >> numbers and from what numbers can prove (and know, and observe, and >> bet, ...) about themselves, that is from both extensional and >> intensional number theory. >> The UDA shows *why* physics *has to* be derived from numbers (assuming >> CT + "yes doctor"). >> The Lobian interview explains (or should explain, if you have not yet >> grasp the point) *how* to do that. >> >> Bruno >> > > If the UDA is sound that would certainly refute what I'm claiming > yes. > I want to see how physics (which as far I'm concerned *is* > geometry - at least I think pure physics=geometry) emerges *purely* > from theories of sets/numbers/categories. OK. Note that UDA says only why, not how. "how" is given by the lobian interview, and gives only the "propositional physics" (as part of the propositional "theology"). > > I base my claims on ontological considerations (5 years of deep > thought about ontology), which lead me to strongly suspect the > irreducible property dualism between physical and mathematical > properties. Thus I'm highly skeptical of UDA but have yet to property > study it. Lacking resources to do proper study here at the > moment.... :-( We are in the same boat ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---