Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :

> > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob >> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL). > > Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory? I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it experimentally. (Also it is not *my *theory, but the Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is, the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness). But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive verifiable/refutable propositions: -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their indirect effects. -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the substitution level. -observable non locality in the same conditionS. - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen Specker phenomenon) - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a purely deterministic global context btw). (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum suicide counterparts, etc.) Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted. The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as called in this list, the (relative) measure problem. Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with too much details) in *Conscience et Mécanisme": http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle). See my Plotinus paper for more precision on this: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf > or something that could be checked experimentally? There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview) for doing that. What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its consequences. My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has empirically verifiable consequences. *My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just (Robinson) arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of view. They are similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' hypostases. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---