Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob
>> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL).
> Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory?

I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can 
believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it 
(Also it is not *my *theory, but the 
Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is, 
the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness).

But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive 
verifiable/refutable propositions:

-existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their 
indirect effects.
-verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any 
isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the 
substitution level.
-observable non locality in the same conditionS.
- non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen 
Specker phenomenon)
- It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I 
don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a 
purely deterministic global context btw).
(+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum 
suicide counterparts, etc.)

Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too 
much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that 
the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization 
consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white 
rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after 
the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted.

The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist 
program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem 
cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in 
showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist 
thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a 
matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as 
called in this list, the (relative) measure problem.
Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with 
too much details) in *Conscience et Mécanisme":

My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of 
Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle). 
See my Plotinus paper for more precision on this:

> or something that could be checked experimentally?

There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To 
progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical 
quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch 
has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest 
result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the 
Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason 
why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview) 
for doing that.

What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an 
application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the 
physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just 
arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in 
trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its 

My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has 
empirically verifiable consequences.
*My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just (Robinson) 
arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of view. They are 
similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' hypostases.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to