I can assure you that Bruno is the last on this list who would "troll". 
He is always very helpful and interested in serious discussion.

I suggest you look at some of his papers before accusing him of trolling.


Brian Tenneson wrote:
> I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop.  Please take
> your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a
> different thread.  Thanks.
> On Mar 6, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob
>>>> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL).
>>> Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory?
>> I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can
>> believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it
>> experimentally.
>> (Also it is not *my *theory, but the
>> Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is,
>> the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness).
>> But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive
>> verifiable/refutable propositions:
>> -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their
>> indirect effects.
>> -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any
>> isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the
>> substitution level.
>> -observable non locality in the same conditionS.
>> - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen
>> Specker phenomenon)
>> - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I
>> don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a
>> purely deterministic global context btw).
>> (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum
>> suicide counterparts, etc.)
>> Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too
>> much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that
>> the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization
>> consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white
>> rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after
>> the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted.
>> The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist
>> program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem
>> cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in
>> showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist
>> thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a
>> matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as
>> called in this list, the (relative) measure problem.
>> Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with
>> too much details) in *Conscience et 
>> Mécanisme":
>> My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of
>> Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle).
>> See my Plotinus paper for more precision on 
>> this:
>>> or something that could be checked experimentally?
>> There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To
>> progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical
>> quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch
>> has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest
>> result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the
>> Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason
>> why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview)
>> for doing that.
>> What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an
>> application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the
>> physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just
>> arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in
>> trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its
>> consequences.
>> My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has
>> empirically verifiable consequences.
>> *My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just (Robinson)
>> arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of view. They are
>> similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' hypostases.
>> Bruno
> > 

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