Brian, I can assure you that Bruno is the last on this list who would "troll". He is always very helpful and interested in serious discussion.

I suggest you look at some of his papers before accusing him of trolling. Günther Brian Tenneson wrote: > I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop. Please take > your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a > different thread. Thanks. > > On Mar 6, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >> >> >> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob >>>> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL). >>> Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory? >> I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can >> believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it >> experimentally. >> (Also it is not *my *theory, but the >> Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is, >> the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness). >> >> But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive >> verifiable/refutable propositions: >> >> -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their >> indirect effects. >> -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any >> isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the >> substitution level. >> -observable non locality in the same conditionS. >> - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen >> Specker phenomenon) >> - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I >> don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a >> purely deterministic global context btw). >> (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum >> suicide counterparts, etc.) >> >> Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too >> much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that >> the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization >> consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white >> rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after >> the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted. >> >> The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist >> program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem >> cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in >> showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist >> thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a >> matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as >> called in this list, the (relative) measure problem. >> Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with >> too much details) in *Conscience et >> Mécanisme":http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html >> >> My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of >> Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle). >> See my Plotinus paper for more precision on >> this:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf >> >>> or something that could be checked experimentally? >> There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To >> progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical >> quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch >> has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest >> result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the >> Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason >> why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview) >> for doing that. >> >> What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an >> application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the >> physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just >> arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in >> trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its >> consequences. >> >> My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has >> empirically verifiable consequences. >> *My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just (Robinson) >> arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of view. They are >> similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' hypostases. >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---