That's an appeal to authority.  The discussion here has nothing to do
with my ideas, they are about Bruno's ideas, especially in Bruno's
answer to a question directed to him.

I also find it odd that Bruno suggests asking specific questions but
in the link I posted to sci.logic, there were several specific

Seems like it might just be easier to stick to sci.logic.  Less
politics involved.

How is that not trolling?

On Mar 6, 1:32 pm, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Brian,
> I can assure you that Bruno is the last on this list who would "troll".
> He is always very helpful and interested in serious discussion.
> I suggest you look at some of his papers before accusing him of trolling.
> Günther
> Brian Tenneson wrote:
> > I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop.  Please take
> > your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a
> > different thread.  Thanks.
> > On Mar 6, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob
> >>>> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL).
> >>> Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory?
> >> I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can
> >> believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it
> >> experimentally.
> >> (Also it is not *my *theory, but the
> >> Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is,
> >> the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness).
> >> But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive
> >> verifiable/refutable propositions:
> >> -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their
> >> indirect effects.
> >> -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any
> >> isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the
> >> substitution level.
> >> -observable non locality in the same conditionS.
> >> - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen
> >> Specker phenomenon)
> >> - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I
> >> don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a
> >> purely deterministic global context btw).
> >> (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum
> >> suicide counterparts, etc.)
> >> Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too
> >> much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that
> >> the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization
> >> consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white
> >> rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after
> >> the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted.
> >> The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist
> >> program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem
> >> cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in
> >> showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist
> >> thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a
> >> matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as
> >> called in this list, the (relative) measure problem.
> >> Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with
> >> too much details) in *Conscience et 
> >> Mécanisme":
> >> My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of
> >> Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle).
> >> See my Plotinus paper for more precision on 
> >> this:
> >>> or something that could be checked experimentally?
> >> There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To
> >> progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical
> >> quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch
> >> has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest
> >> result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the
> >> Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason
> >> why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview)
> >> for doing that.
> >> What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an
> >> application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the
> >> physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just
> >> arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in
> >> trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its
> >> consequences.
> >> My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has
> >> empirically verifiable consequences.
> >> *My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just (Robinson)
> >> arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of view. They are
> >> similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' hypostases.
> >> Bruno
> >>
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