It's obvious now who is the troll... Good idea to propose to return where you came from.

Quentin Le Friday 07 March 2008 03:45:45 Brian Tenneson, vous avez écrit : > That's an appeal to authority. The discussion here has nothing to do > with my ideas, they are about Bruno's ideas, especially in Bruno's > answer to a question directed to him. > > I also find it odd that Bruno suggests asking specific questions but > in the link I posted to sci.logic, there were several specific > questions. > > Seems like it might just be easier to stick to sci.logic. Less > politics involved. > > How is that not trolling? > > On Mar 6, 1:32 pm, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Brian, > > > > I can assure you that Bruno is the last on this list who would "troll". > > He is always very helpful and interested in serious discussion. > > > > I suggest you look at some of his papers before accusing him of trolling. > > > > Günther > > > > Brian Tenneson wrote: > > > I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop. Please take > > > your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a > > > different thread. Thanks. > > > > > > On Mar 6, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > >> Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >>>> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob > > >>>> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL). > > >>> > > >>> Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory? > > >> > > >> I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we > > >> can believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute > > >> it experimentally. > > >> (Also it is not *my *theory, but the > > >> Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is, > > >> the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness). > > >> > > >> But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive > > >> verifiable/refutable propositions: > > >> > > >> -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their > > >> indirect effects. > > >> -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any > > >> isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the > > >> substitution level. > > >> -observable non locality in the same conditionS. > > >> - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen > > >> Specker phenomenon) > > >> - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I > > >> don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in > > >> a purely deterministic global context btw). > > >> (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum > > >> suicide counterparts, etc.) > > >> > > >> Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too > > >> much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that > > >> the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization > > >> consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white > > >> rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after > > >> the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted. > > >> > > >> The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist > > >> program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem > > >> cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in > > >> showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the > > >> computationalist thesis is two times more difficult than without, > > >> because it leads to a matter problem, under the form of the white > > >> rabbit problem, or, as called in this list, the (relative) measure > > >> problem. > > >> Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with > > >> too much details) in *Conscience et > > >> Mécanisme":http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecani > > >>sme.html > > >> > > >> My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of > > >> Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle). > > >> See my Plotinus paper for more precision on > > >> this:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf > > >> > > >>> or something that could be checked experimentally? > > >> > > >> There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To > > >> progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical > > >> quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch > > >> has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest > > >> result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the > > >> Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason > > >> why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview) > > >> for doing that. > > >> > > >> What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an > > >> application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the > > >> physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just > > >> arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in > > >> trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its > > >> consequences. > > >> > > >> My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has > > >> empirically verifiable consequences. > > >> *My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just > > >> (Robinson) arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of > > >> view. They are similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' > > >> hypostases. > > >> > > >> Bruno > > >> > > >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---