It's obvious now who is the troll...

Good idea to propose to return where you came from.

Quentin


Le Friday 07 March 2008 03:45:45 Brian Tenneson, vous avez écrit :
> That's an appeal to authority.  The discussion here has nothing to do
> with my ideas, they are about Bruno's ideas, especially in Bruno's
> answer to a question directed to him.
>
> I also find it odd that Bruno suggests asking specific questions but
> in the link I posted to sci.logic, there were several specific
> questions.
>
> Seems like it might just be easier to stick to sci.logic.  Less
> politics involved.
>
> How is that not trolling?
>
> On Mar 6, 1:32 pm, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Brian,
> >
> > I can assure you that Bruno is the last on this list who would "troll".
> > He is always very helpful and interested in serious discussion.
> >
> > I suggest you look at some of his papers before accusing him of trolling.
> >
> > Günther
> >
> > Brian Tenneson wrote:
> > > I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop.  Please take
> > > your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a
> > > different thread.  Thanks.
> > >
> > > On Mar 6, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > >> Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > >>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > >>>> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob
> > >>>> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL).
> > >>>
> > >>> Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory?
> > >>
> > >> I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we
> > >> can believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute
> > >> it experimentally.
> > >> (Also it is not *my *theory, but the
> > >> Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is,
> > >> the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness).
> > >>
> > >> But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive
> > >> verifiable/refutable propositions:
> > >>
> > >> -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their
> > >> indirect effects.
> > >> -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any
> > >> isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the
> > >> substitution level.
> > >> -observable non locality in the same conditionS.
> > >> - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen
> > >> Specker phenomenon)
> > >> - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I
> > >> don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in
> > >> a purely deterministic global context btw).
> > >> (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum
> > >> suicide counterparts, etc.)
> > >>
> > >> Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too
> > >> much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that
> > >> the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization
> > >> consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white
> > >> rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after
> > >> the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted.
> > >>
> > >> The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist
> > >> program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem
> > >> cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in
> > >> showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the
> > >> computationalist thesis is two times more difficult than without,
> > >> because it leads to a matter problem, under the form of the white
> > >> rabbit problem, or, as called in this list, the (relative) measure
> > >> problem.
> > >> Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with
> > >> too much details) in *Conscience et
> > >> Mécanisme":http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecani
> > >>sme.html
> > >>
> > >> My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of
> > >> Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle).
> > >> See my Plotinus paper for more precision on
> > >> this:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf
> > >>
> > >>> or something that could be checked experimentally?
> > >>
> > >> There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To
> > >> progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical
> > >> quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch
> > >> has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest
> > >> result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the
> > >> Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason
> > >> why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview)
> > >> for doing that.
> > >>
> > >> What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an
> > >> application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the
> > >> physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just
> > >> arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in
> > >> trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its
> > >> consequences.
> > >>
> > >> My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has
> > >> empirically verifiable consequences.
> > >> *My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just
> > >> (Robinson) arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of
> > >> view. They are similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus'
> > >> hypostases.
> > >>
> > >> Bruno
> > >>
> > >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> 


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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