----- Original Message ----- From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2008 2:56 AM Subject: Malcom/Standish white rabbit solution . . . >> >> (There appears to be a subsidiary issue of 'many description >> strings to one OM' (what you seem to be saying in your first email para), >> but perhaps that can be dealt with by different definiions of 'OM' - you >> seem to think of it as one OM 'type', whereas I think of it as one OM >> 'occurrence'.) >> > > Multiple description strings map to a single OM. This is a relatively > obvious feature of a functionalist theory, which this theory is. > > One can certainly think of the OM being an occurrence, but you m ust > also realise that there a multiple identical OMs (an uncountable > infinity in fact) within the everything.
Comparing identical OM's/OM sequences, it seems to me that I am most likely to be ['in'] that sequence of OM occurrences that is in one of the simplest universes that can produce them (cet. par.). (Reason given below.) >> Perhaps the most direct route to the problem is your statement at the end >> of >> section 4.2 that (paraphrasing), the problem of induction is not a >> problem >> for the plenitude provided [either the Schmidhuber solution holds or] >> observers always tend to model reality, find patterns, theories and so on >> that compress the description of the world around them, discarding >> non-model-fitting bits as 'noise'. >> >> The reason that there is no failure of induction (in general), under this >> scenario is, as I stated under (b) earlier (which appears to be the one >> closest to your view), that we are most likely to be in one of the >> simplest >> universes that supports SAS's, and it is this that determines the >> complexity >> of the universe that we are in, and provides order for our universe, and >> not >> how observers behave/operate in it. >> > > But where does the premise "we are most likely to be in one of the > simplest > universes that supports SASes" come from, if not from the properties > of the observer? That is what 4.1 is all about (coupled with section > 5.1 of course). > > But section 4.1 does not directly answer the failure of induction > issue. Nothing about Occam's razor says that a universe has to > continue being comprehensible. In your 'Why Occam's Razor' paper, sect 2, following a discussion of the Schmidhuber ensemble and the Universal Prior, it is stated "If we assume the self-sampling asssumption [...t]his implies we should find ourselves in one of the simplest (in terms of C-0[Complexity of description x]) possible universes capable of supporting self-aware substructures (SASes). This is the origin of physical law...". If one takes the description string x (up to some finite limit) as (minimally) representing a universe (and from which OM's are derived), then application of your equivalence class method should solve the WR problem directly (check out my roughly equivalent method at www.physica.freeserve.co.uk/pa01.htm) - this hopefully answers your point above about the origin of our being almost certainly in one of the simplest SAS-supporting universes: the premise can be all logically possible universes (or just 'entities'), some or all of which are representable by description strings (say). (From other comments I earlier assumed this is what you were actually doing - it seems our ideas in this area are significantly different after all.) . . . >> >> I understand that one can think of the universe as a set of cohering >> OM's, >> but the minimal specification of them should be something like a TOE >> (otherwise why do we see neurons and brains etc, if we care to look?), so >> 'physical universe' should normally be a relevant concept. And (under the >> above scenario) it is the simplest universe that counts for measure >> purposes, not the simplest OM - this explains the lack of white rabbits, >> but >> compression of the description of the world and 'random data' being >> discarded by our senses has nothing to do with the WR issue, as far as I >> can see. >> > > The idea of cohering OMs forming a universe relates to the Anthropic > principle. By having phenomenal correlata, one can deduce that there > are other OMs that share a reality, and that which remains invariant > under shifts to different OMs become the law of physics. This is, in > essence Vic Stenger's Point of View Invariance (POVI) principle. This > set of laws of physics is the physical Universe inhabited by the > observers - there's nothing else I can imagine it to be. I have concerns about this kind of approach, but I really ought to take another look at your book before considering comment on this. > > So, it seems you are suggesting that time translation invariance (of > the same observer, but successive OMs) is enough therefore to banish > the white rabbits. But it does hinge on the anthropic principle, which > we need for other things. My '(under the above scenario)' was intended to refer to the whole scenario covered by my earlier comments. Apologies for the ambiguity there. I hope my comments this time around explain my (preferred) criteria for white rabbit banishment. Alastair > > The argument in sect 4.2 does not hinge on the AP, but does rely upon > the property of robustness of the observer, which I haven't completely > formalised, but I have made a couple of attempts in postings on this > list. Unfortunately, I just did a quick search in GoogleGroups, and > can't lay my hands on them just at the minute. > > Perhaps there is some connection between robustness and the AP? > > I really should write up a formal version of the robustness concept > somewhere more permanent, and also try to develop a formal model of > the process to see what happens in the face of pure white noise. I'm > sure it won't be white rabbits, as the argument in section 4.2 still > seems valid to me, but whether it is anything interpretable as a > universe is another thing. > > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > ----- End forwarded message ----- > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---