Hi Jason,

Le 28-mars-08, à 01:07, Jason a écrit :

> To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
> with mind states as COMP assumes,

This could be a misleading way to present the thing, especially in 
front of a physicalist which most of the time tends to equate a 
computational state with a physical state. With comp, by subjective 
indeterminacy, we can *associate* a mind state to some computational 
state, but the reverse is not correct, the relation is not one-one, we 
have to associate an infinity of computational states to a mind state. 
For example your current mind state does not depend on the exact 
position of some electron in your brain, and more generally your mind 
state is associated with all possible relative incarnation/history of 
your computational state.

> and if this universe is computable,

Hmmm... I try to insist that, well ... in a nutshell, that IF I am a 
machine, THEN the universe is NOT computable. Neither the physical 
universe, nor the mathematical universe. The reason is that IF I am a 
machine, THEN what I can observe emerges from an infinity of 
computations going through my current state of mind. You are perhaps 
confusing Schmidhuberian constructive physics with what I take as being 
the consequence of indexical comp (there is a level such that *I* 
survive a substitution done at that level, and this whatever my first 
person (subjective) "I" believe to have as local incarnated third 
person "I" (body)).

> would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular
> mind?  I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by
> experience.  Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is
> experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication
> and accessibility.  If you take a normal brain and cut the link
> between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not
> the same mind only limited in transfer of information?  What if we
> grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could
> share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via
> communication.  Since all particles in this universe are interacting,
> the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe,
> or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time.  If
> this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a
> maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be
> perceived.

I (or just comp if I am correct) agree(s) more with Plotinus ineffable 
ONE that with a personalized big whole like in some Christian 
reinterpretation of Plotinus neoplatonism. But Plotinus is not always 
clearcut on that question, and if you make the substitution level 
somehow infinitily low, then there could be a sense we are all the same 
person and we are ourselves the big whole. I personally doubt this, but 
who knows ... It is too early to draw a definitive conclusion from comp 
on this point.



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