----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, March 28, 2008 1:09 AM
Subject: Re: Malcom/Standish white rabbit solution

> On Wed, Mar 26, 2008 at 04:19:44PM -0000, Alastair Malcolm wrote:
>> >
>> > The minimal specification including all OMs in a universe could not be
>> > sufficient to specify the OMs completely. There must always be some
>> > random
>> > component to the complete specification of an OM.
>> Bang goes AI! I can't actually see the necessity for unspecifiable or
>> random-content OM's, but here again I should see if I can unearth an
>> explanation for your above assertion in TON (rememember I am talking
>> about
>> OM occurrences when I refer to OM's - part of my probably erroneous
>> assumptions about your approach). I am guessing there will be some
>> premise
>> somewhere I can't agree with.
> The simplest way of seeing this is Bruno's UDA, which necessarily
> implies that OMs have some randomness (subjective indeterminancy). Of
> course, this argument assumes computationalism, but I believe the UDA
> also generalises to functionalism, as it mainly depends on the assumption
> of consciousness surviving the copy operation.
> In ToN, I also explore the relationship between randomness and
> creativity in chapter 6.
> As to your pessimism about AI, I don't share that. It is quite
> feasible to add sources of quantum randomness to machines, and indeed
> there is already quite a bit of literature on this subject, mostly for
> cryptographic applications.

My point here was that you seem to be rejecting any possibility of some
classically based (ie digitally programmed) AI having OM (occurrences). More
for me to find out about how close you are to Bruno's ideas here. (I wasn't
saying *I* was pessimistic about AI .)

>> At least I can understand a *little* better what you are trying to do,
>> which
>> is why I am more satisfied our approaches are fundamentally different.
> Fair enough. I don't share the literary scholar's enthusiasm to get
> positions and differences that occurred in the past correct. All that
> matters to me are ideas, and if your current position differs from
> mine, it is interesting to explore that. If I have misrepresented your
> position circa 1999 in ToN, I apologize for that, but I don't regard
> this as an important mistake.

I am more concerned to avoid future confusion and missing of possibly
important ideas by erroneously conflating them with others (which can cut
both ways).

>> A final brief point in an attempt to help clarify matters. The failure of
>> induction problem is about the next OM's, fine, but the applicability of
>> the
>> minimal specification of a universe (bit string, axiom set, whatever, and
>> akin to a TOE if such exists) *itself* ensures that there is no failure
>> of
>> induction (in general) - there is nothing special about now, or the next
>> few
>> OM's.
> This only works in deterministic universes. I don't think we live in one.

That implies you reject mwi (successful induction for me, and the minimal
specification, would include allowing for qm probabilities, which is
deterministically in mwi terms; limited *subjective* indeterminism, as I
understand it at least, is not excluded by the above) - but I really *must*
shut up and look at your book.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to