On Fri, Mar 28, 2008 at 09:51:34PM -0000, Alastair Malcolm wrote:
> >
> > As to your pessimism about AI, I don't share that. It is quite
> > feasible to add sources of quantum randomness to machines, and indeed
> > there is already quite a bit of literature on this subject, mostly for
> > cryptographic applications.
> 
> My point here was that you seem to be rejecting any possibility of some
> classically based (ie digitally programmed) AI having OM (occurrences). More
> for me to find out about how close you are to Bruno's ideas here. (I wasn't
> saying *I* was pessimistic about AI .)

I take it you mean that I'm rejecting the possibility that an appropriately
programmed Turing Machine can be conscious, and the answer is yes, I
do. However, the reasons for that have more to do with the creativity
angle than with Bruno's argument, which actually presupposes that this
is possible. However, Bruno's argument shows that even if a Turing
Machine is conscious, its OMs will be uncomputable, and so the white
rabbit problem exists for computationalism as well.

> 
> .
> .
> .
> >> At least I can understand a *little* better what you are trying to do,
> >> which
> >> is why I am more satisfied our approaches are fundamentally different.
> >
> > Fair enough. I don't share the literary scholar's enthusiasm to get
> > positions and differences that occurred in the past correct. All that
> > matters to me are ideas, and if your current position differs from
> > mine, it is interesting to explore that. If I have misrepresented your
> > position circa 1999 in ToN, I apologize for that, but I don't regard
> > this as an important mistake.
> 
> I am more concerned to avoid future confusion and missing of possibly
> important ideas by erroneously conflating them with others (which can cut
> both ways).

Exactly.

> 
> >> A final brief point in an attempt to help clarify matters. The failure of
> >> induction problem is about the next OM's, fine, but the applicability of
> >> the
> >> minimal specification of a universe (bit string, axiom set, whatever, and
> >> akin to a TOE if such exists) *itself* ensures that there is no failure
> >> of
> >> induction (in general) - there is nothing special about now, or the next
> >> few
> >> OM's.
> >>
> >
> > This only works in deterministic universes. I don't think we live in one.
> 
> That implies you reject mwi (successful induction for me, and the minimal
> specification, would include allowing for qm probabilities, which is
> deterministically in mwi terms; limited *subjective* indeterminism, as I
> understand it at least, is not excluded by the above) - but I really *must*
> shut up and look at your book.
> 

No - by universe, I mean a classical branch of the multiverse. The
multiverse is, as you say, deterministic. 

-- 

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Mathematics                              
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