Dear List,

I searched through the archive, this paper does not seem to have been 

Quantity of Experience: Brain-Duplication and Degrees of Consciousness

If two brains are in identical states, are there two numerically 
distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? Two, I argue. But what 
happens in intermediary cases? This paper looks in detail at this 
question and suggests that there can be a fractional (non-integer) 
number of qualitatively identical experiences. This has implications for 
what it is to implement a computation and for Chalmer's Fading Qualia 
thought experiment. [Minds and Machines, 2006, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 185-200]

It raises some issues the UDA is concerned with.
What do you think of it?

Best Regards,

Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna


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