----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Günther Greindl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, April 19, 2008 9:46 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law

> Dear Nichomachus,
>
>> decision. If she measures the particle's spin as positive, she will
>> elect to switch cases, and if she measures it with a negative spin she
>> will keep the one she has. This is because she wants to be sure that,
>> having gotten to this point in the game, there will be at least some
>> branches of her existence where she experiences winning the grand
>> prize. She is not convinced that, were she to decide what to do using
>> only the processes available to her mind, she would guarantee that
>> same result since it is just possible that all of the mutiple versions
>> of herself confronted with the dilemma may make the same bad guess.
>
>
> I have also thought along these lines some time ago (to use a qubit to
> ensure that all outcomes are chosen, because one should not rely on
> one's mind decohering into all possible decisions).
>
> The essential question is this: what worlds exist? All possible worlds.
> But which worlds are possible? We have, on the one hand, physical
> possibility (this also includes other physical constants etc, but no
> totally unphysical scenarios).
>
> I have long adhered to this "everything physically possible", but this
> does break down under closer scrutiny: first of all, physical relations
> are, when things come down to it, mathematical relations.
>
> So we could conclude with Max Tegmark: all possible mathematical
> structures exist; this is ill defined (but then, why should the
> Everything be well defined?)
>
> Alastair argues in his paper that everything logically possible exists
> (with his non arbitrariness principle) but, while initially appealing,
> it leads to the question: what is logically possible? In what logic?
> Classical/Intuitionist/Deviant logics etc etc...then we are back at
> Max's all possible structures.
>

The focus of my paper is on theories in principle fully describing universes
(or u-reality). The term 'logically possible' is intended to contrast with
'physically possible' and refers to descriptions (theories) being internally
non-contradictory (more in note 4 in my paper). Classical logic is usually
intended in these kinds of cases, and I can't actually see from what I know
of other logics how they might relevantly extend the range of possible
inhabitable universes beyond those describable by formal systems operating
according to classical logic. (There is also the issue of their additional
complexity, if some are somehow incorporatable.) I do mention in general
terms possible alternatives to standard formal systems at the start of
section 4. For my purposes all I need is a plausible way around the White
Rabbit problem. In my view its deep philosophical basis and potential
explanation of our relative simplicity and lawfulness are points in favour
of the 'All Possible States' hypothesis, and the idea of not being able to
fully characterize it is pretty much to be expected given its universal
scope.

Alastair

Paper at: http://www.physica.freeserve.co.uk/pa01.htm

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