- CRH implies COMP
- COMP implies the negation of CRH
> Universality, Sigma_1 completeness, m-completness, creativity
>(in Post sense), all those equivalent notion makes sense only through
>complementary notion which are strictly sepaking more complex (non RE,
>The self-introspecting universal machine can hardly miss the inference
of such "realities",
> and once she distinguishes the 1, 1-plural, 3-person points of view,
she has to bet on
>the role of the non computable realities (even too much getting not
>like QM, but an hard to compute set of anomalous stories
> (white rabbits, coherent but inconsistent dreams).
Why does the machine have to bet on these complementary non-RE
histories? I do not quite see how this arises from 1 and 1-plural POV;
after all, it could be just rec. enumerable continuations?
Schmidhuber's/Tegmarks Computable Universe Hypothesis seems very
attractive: it gives rise to structure, _evolves_ self-aware
sub-structures, and gives reasonable (?) measure, for instance
Schmidhuber's speed prior.
This also takes care of the white rabbit.
> It's a bit like "understanding" (putting in a RE set) the (code of) the total
> functions, forces us to accept the existence of only partially
>which sometimes (most of the time, see the thesis by Terwijn) have a
non recursive domain.
> OK, the ontic part of a comp TOE can be no *more* than Sigma_1 complete,
>but a non self-computable part of Arithmetical truth and analytical
>is needed to get the *internal* measure, we can't even give a name
>to our first person plenitude and things like that.
I think this answers part of my question above. The ontic part is only
the Sigma_1 complete stuff; we assume the others for our measure - but
my claim is that they do not give rise to first person experience.
I think the central question is this: _what_ does the Arithemetic Truth
of whatever simulate? Reality at a granular level (like in the CA
approach, Zuse's Rechnender Raum) - that is what I would assume - that
reality at the lowest level is a number-relation; but that awareness
only arises in these domains as a higher oder abstraction.
I think you assume that the Sigma_1 sentences give the OMs directly, is
that correct? So in your view there is no underlying reality; QM and
stuff like that is only an "illusion". Am I correct in how I interpret
> Perhaps this is why the Intelligible has been discovered (Plato) before the
>(Plotin). It is far bigger. With comp you can restrict the ontic to
the Universal Machine
> (the baby ONE),
Ok, I'm with you this far.
> but its intelligible realm is well beyond its grasp.
For me, the intelligible can be only a (proper?) subset of the ontic.
How could something that does not exist (ontic) be intelligible? Or
would you say that this is mathematical imagination?
> All this is related to the fact, already understood by Judson Webb,
>that comp is truly a vaccine against reductionist theories of the mind.
I have the Webb book on my desk and have glanced occasionally inside, it
looks like a wonderful book, but I have not yet had the time to study
it in detail.
But I wonder - why do you say that comp is not reductionist? For me comp
is reductionist - mind as the working of computation (I am pro
reductionist, that is not a negative word in my view).
So, two questions:
1) At what level do your Sigma_1 sentence operate? OM's directly (I
would interpret your paper in this way) or low level (more like a
classical physical/digital physics view)?
2) You say that the ontic part is computable (in this sense, I would say
COMP does _not_ refute CRH?) Because what "is" that is not ontic? That
would be contradiction in terms?
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at