Dear Bruno,

thanks for the long and informative post.

> Hmmm.... The UDA should just show that, and I am not sure which points 
> you are missing. Suppose there is a physical concrete universe and that 

I know that I am missing a point somewhere :-)
I have printed out your post and will work it through carefully, it will 
take some time before I can respond.

> Please ask any questions. 

Thanks, as said above, will take some time.

>Be sure you have completely grasp the first 
> person comp indeterminacy before anything else (but the 1-3 distinction 

1-person indeterminacy is no problem. My problem begins along steps 6-8,
especially when you dump the physical universe :-)

This also relates to the duplication issue in the Bostrom paper:
when one presupposes physicalism, then duplication seems to be the 
"proper" attitude - especially combined with a monist identity theory
of consciousness with matter (no supervenience or stuff, see this paper
for what I mean:

Galen Strawson, 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism' 2006
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/philosophy/people/strawson/rmwpep.pdf

It is really good (for physicalists at least :-))

And, as mentioned, I don't quite see how adoption of comp throws out 
physicalism (I understand the argument, but what about parallelism - is 
it a measure theoretic argument then against physicalism?).

(Addendum: I mean physicalism in the broadest sense: I do not need 
Aristotelian substance or whatever, simple structural relations à la 
platonic computations suffice -> this is no standard position, but I am 
working on this; the main difference between your position would be that 
the SR variant includes spatiotemporal coordinates (at least from the 
frog view) which could lead to duplication for identical computations 
except for spatiotemporal labels)

Assuming your variant (comp, yes doctor, AR):
I would be interested in what happens if, in a computational history, 
you start seeing another "you" being simulated: like a russian doll, 
comp within comp-> let us say you construct a VR that simulates for the 
VR Bruno the same environment as the "outside"/"mainline comp" Bruno 
sees -> would this comp within comp then add to the "outside" Bruno 
measure? (I hope it is clear what I mean) - anyway, I have written more 
than I wanted, another (real) response will follow when I have found the 
time to think through your previous answer to me.

Thanks again for your effort to make clear yours ideas, it is well 
appreciated!

Cheers,
Günther


-- 
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/

Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org

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