Indeed, thanks. This has been very interesting. It will take me some time
to process this.
On Wed, May 7, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Dear Bruno,
> thanks for the long and informative post.
> > Hmmm.... The UDA should just show that, and I am not sure which points
> > you are missing. Suppose there is a physical concrete universe and that
> I know that I am missing a point somewhere :-)
> I have printed out your post and will work it through carefully, it will
> take some time before I can respond.
> > Please ask any questions.
> Thanks, as said above, will take some time.
> >Be sure you have completely grasp the first
> > person comp indeterminacy before anything else (but the 1-3 distinction
> 1-person indeterminacy is no problem. My problem begins along steps 6-8,
> especially when you dump the physical universe :-)
> This also relates to the duplication issue in the Bostrom paper:
> when one presupposes physicalism, then duplication seems to be the
> "proper" attitude - especially combined with a monist identity theory
> of consciousness with matter (no supervenience or stuff, see this paper
> for what I mean:
> Galen Strawson, 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism'
> It is really good (for physicalists at least :-))
> And, as mentioned, I don't quite see how adoption of comp throws out
> physicalism (I understand the argument, but what about parallelism - is
> it a measure theoretic argument then against physicalism?).
> (Addendum: I mean physicalism in the broadest sense: I do not need
> Aristotelian substance or whatever, simple structural relations à la
> platonic computations suffice -> this is no standard position, but I am
> working on this; the main difference between your position would be that
> the SR variant includes spatiotemporal coordinates (at least from the
> frog view) which could lead to duplication for identical computations
> except for spatiotemporal labels)
> Assuming your variant (comp, yes doctor, AR):
> I would be interested in what happens if, in a computational history,
> you start seeing another "you" being simulated: like a russian doll,
> comp within comp-> let us say you construct a VR that simulates for the
> VR Bruno the same environment as the "outside"/"mainline comp" Bruno
> sees -> would this comp within comp then add to the "outside" Bruno
> measure? (I hope it is clear what I mean) - anyway, I have written more
> than I wanted, another (real) response will follow when I have found the
> time to think through your previous answer to me.
> Thanks again for your effort to make clear yours ideas, it is well
> Günther Greindl
> Department of Philosophy of Science
> University of Vienna
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
> Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org
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