On Thu, May 08, 2008 at 04:31:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Really? I think Schmidhuber's speed prior concerns intrinsic 
> computational speed (like when comparing different algorithm). If not, 
> nothing computational would remains in Schmidhuber's approach. Step 5 
> (or even 4) is where I part company with Nozick's closer continuer 
> theory of identity, at least if the "closer" relation is based on the a 
> priori physical.

As I understand it, the speed prior is used to argue that the world we see
is produced by programs that aren't too logically deep (Bennett's
logical depth concept), God's (sorry the Great Programmer's) computer
has limited capacity.

So even if a particular universe has a very compressed representation,
and so would have a lot of representations within the universal
dovetailer, it would not be that likely to be observed as it has high
logical depth. Only the middle complexity programs of moderate logical
depth account for most of the measure.

A program suffering interrupts would also suffer relatively to one that
wasn't so suffering by that argument, hence my link to your UDA step
5. Of course, one might expect that the GP to be fairly even handed about
his creatures, but perhaps like the Linux scheduling algorithm, there
is a prioritisation between processes.

Anyway, I thought this idea is of some interest - but I'm happy to be
shot down. We are arguing over an interpretation of someone else's
worldview that neither of us have any attachment to anyway.

Cheers
-- 

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