Hi Bruno,

I must admit to a little hand waving.  OK, maybe a lot.  So I shall try some
more of it; I think I will practice it in case I ever need to persuade
anyone to believe my conjectures are true, false, or neither.

What I mean to say, if you will, is actually a slightly (only slightly) more
formal version of what another poster said.  4 of my lines in my repetitive
post were "random" while the rest was highly compressible, say in terms of
Kolmogorov complexity, and therefore -not- random.

To turn that into a semi-informal argument, accepting that as a premise and
labeling scheme (ie, that "originality" is sort of a synonym for
randomness), key assumption here being that is what random utterances look
like [***], then here is the implication:
For "my output" to be random, say, if I were a (self-aware by assumption)
device in the sense of David Wolpert (of NASA), consciousness is a necessary
condition.

I usually mess up how to translate that word into a conditional, I must
admit.  I visualize a set C of all conscious things (or devices, if you
will) to then be "bigger" bubble than randomness.  Now, either that, or
there is overlap but R is not fully contained in C.  This is totally
speculative!  Let's go, with the sake of argument, that R is fully contained
in C.  Then the implication should be that if x is a Wolpert-ian device then
R(x) ==> C(x), and this is -only- more hand-waving and not proof of my
earlier claim.



(That seems quite obviously false if x is not a device or some type of thing
already known to be a machine.  I think in proving odd things are conscious,
the first step would be to demonstrate that it is a device which ought to be
hard in many cases.)

Also, that is quite a stretch, I realize, as that would imply that some sort
of "conscious design" (not ID but CD) is actually the case in the universe
due to the seemingly random fluctuations on the quantum scale. That is,
unless one uses a now-outdated definition of intelligence as meaning
something like the term "evil intelligence" that Descartes might have used;
in that event, ID might be correct if one severely abuses the language (I
have no desire to prove or disprove any such matters).



So, to recap my implications/speculations, let x be a device and notation as
in an above post:
O(x) ==> R([x]) ==> C(x) <== S(x) <== O(x)
Furthermore, the brackets [x] and the whole R([x]) and each implication
would have to be in the context of a suitable MV-logic since these are -all-
vague notions, especially consciousness.  I doubt Omniscience is a vague
notion though. .. ... .... ..... ......  I'm thinking I'll need brackets for
only the vague notions and maybe that will be a telegraphing notation to
indicate that such is a vague notion.  Fortunately, crisp logic is fully
compatible with enough MV-logics for the implications to even work, so this
might be closer to the final notation of what will be conjecture 6 in my
next draft of algebraic physics article:
O(x) ==> R([x]) ==> C([x]) <== S([x]) <== O(x)

PS, I think we're all birds here!

-Brian


[***] I think that randomness is best defined not with two categories,
random and not random, but with shades of or degrees of randomness and
Many-Valued non-classical logics are perfect for -vague notions-, as are
non-well founded set theories.  My first crack at what I wrote down earlier
in my abstract here was to use a non-well founded set theory to define
self-awareness in a circular fashion.  As extremely unsatisfying as that is,
I was hoping that I could develop a well-founded theory out of that and then
finish this sentence:
something has Self Awareness if and only if __________fill in blank_________
where that blank is filled with only well-founded notions.

Effectively, I wanted to "solve for what Self Awareness is" in the context
of NON-WF set theory but present something in terms of a WF set theory,
essentially like how an electrical engineer uses Complex Numbers in the
intermediate calculations and then presents something to his boss in terms
of only real numbers.

And I still feel inclined to do that (or try to do that if I can't do it)
but my time for research is exceptionally limited at this time.


On Tue, May 13, 2008 at 7:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
> Hi Brian,
>
> Le 13-mai-08, à 02:00, Brian Tenneson a écrit :
>
> >
> > [...]
>
> > To recapitulate, the statement of the idea is this:
> >  [1]
> > Randomness implies consciousness.
>
>
> I don't see why, or even what this could mean.
>
>
>
> > The converse appears to be false.
>
>
> Comp (+ Consciousness or just first person perspective) implies (first
> person) randomness (Cf step 3 of the UDA).
>
>
>
> >
> > [2]
> > SAS implies consciousness.
>
> OK (but trivial, imo)
>
>
> > The converse appears to be false.  <consider a one-second-old frog,
> > for example>
>
>
> I think you're a bit unfair with the old frogs ...
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>
>
> >
>

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