Hi Gunther,

On Wed, May 7, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Günther Greindl 

>  Galen Strawson, 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails 
> panpsychism' 2006
> http://web.gc.cuny.edu/philosophy/people/strawson/rmwpep.pdf

The author admits himself that his doctrine is more a form of 
experential/non-experiential-ist (thus dualist) doctrine. It seems to 
me the usual dual naturalism. I can agree with the idea that 
"consciousness" is physical, but not as an explanation of 
consciousness, still less of course as an explanation of what is 
matter. It is exactly like Searle, but with "physical" in place of 
Let me know if you understand that computationalism is just 
incompatible with that sort of move. Comp reduces completely the mind 
body problem into a necessary derivation of body-matter from a 
number/mind theory (like computer science, provablity logic + 
intensional variants, etc.).

With comp, and a bit poetically, the physical is the border of 
computer's computer science (the border of computer science as seen by 

But I have not yet finished Strawson's paper. Up to now, I appreciate 
it because it is quite clear (and thus clearly unconvincing with 
respect to the comp hyp).

Thanks for the reference. Best,



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