1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?
'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by
looking at it in a first sight that it would means the one universe
hypothesis is simpler than MW. Yes, one universe involves many less
than MW (either there exists a finite number of other universes or
infinitely many)... Then by O'R we should take the one universe
hypothesis as simpler because requiring less universes (in this case
1). But it's an ill way of understanding O'R... It should be
understood as saying something about the premises, the axioms... One
shouldn't add an axiom unnecessarily. And in this case none of one
univers, 42 universes or infinitely many hypothesis are simpler
relative to each other... and O'R could not help you choose or if it
could help for something would be to choose the 0 univers
hypothesis... well 0 < 1 << oo and this for all values of 0 even big
2) Why turing emulability of the mind entails first person
undeterminacy and/or MW ?
Because if you're a computation then you're not dependant on the
substrate of the computation... but only to the computation itself. A
computation is substrate independant.
Well you'd say it may be substrate independent but still it needs a
substrate to 'exist'. Ok let's accept that, but let's return on the
mind and on the hypothesis that the mind is a computation and the
brain the substrate on which it is run. As a computation is substrate
independant then what follows is if the mind is a computation it can
be run on other computational substrate for example on a... computer
for example. And 'the mind' wouldn't be able to tell if it is run on a
brain or on a computer. By our hypothesis the mind is a computation,
and a computation is dependant only on it's state and transition rule,
if the same input is given to the same algorithm it will yield the
same result so seeing a brain is of no help because you would see a
brain even run somewhere else if the same input is given.
So why this entails first person undeterminacy and/or MW ? let's
assume we could replicate the computation of your mind (I have assume
by hypothesis that it is a computation, so replication can be done,
even if currently we don't have a clue and even we don't know if the
mind is a computation... but here I assume it just for the argument to
see what it entails) then I could execute the 'you' computation on a
computer then if I can, I can also run the 'you' computation not only
on one computer but on many computers. Ok so now I have at least two
computers running the same mind (computation)... I switch off one
computer, the mind die ? hell no, by our hypothesis mind is
computation and the computation is still running on the other
computer. So from the point of view of the mind unplugging one of the
two computers didn't change a thing. Now I'm a real serail killer I
switch of the last computer running the computation/mind... so now the
mind die now ?? Let's say I've done a program dump before stopping the
last computer and I decide 5 years later to rerun the computation from
this save point and on. Wasn't the mind dead ? If it is and mind ==
the computation, how can I have the ability to run the computation
without it being the mind ? It means also that if you're a computation
you can't know at which 'level' you're run (if you're run on a VM
running in a VM running in a VM or a non emulated substrate). So if
mind is a computation to make correct prediction about the next state
you must take all computation having the same state into account. Even
using the 'real switch' theory a mind could be run on different 'real'
(composed of substance) substrate... and the mind will *have* to take
into account these runs on real substrate to make correct prediction.
And unplugging one real substrate run will not kill the mind,
unplugging them all also. The only way would be to not only unplug
them all but to garantee that it wil *never and ever* be run *again*
(even only one).
If I'm run on another computational substrate than
my brain, If someone pull the plug, I die ?
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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