On 12 Aug, 22:50, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/12 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Quentin Anciaux"
> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> 1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?
> >> 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by
> >> looking at it in a first sight that it would means the one universe
> >> hypothesis is simpler than MW. Yes, one universe involves many less
> >> than MW (either there exists a finite number of other universes or
> >> infinitely many)... Then by O'R we should take the one universe
> >> hypothesis as simpler because requiring less universes (in this case
> >> 1). But it's an ill way of understanding O'R... It should be
> >> understood as saying something about the premises, the axioms...
> > Why ? Occam talked about entities. And does MMW really
> > minimise the number of axioms? Doesn't it need the axiom
> > that nothing non-mathematical exists?
> And doesn't the one universe has a 'real switch' axiom that only
> something exists ?
Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an
parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence.
> >> One
> >> shouldn't add an axiom unnecessarily. And in this case none of one
> >> univers, 42 universes or infinitely many hypothesis are simpler
> >> relative to each other...
> > That doesn't follow on either interpretation of O's R. It is
> > obviously false on the "entity" interpretation. On the "axiom"
> > interpretation, if there are exactly 42 universes, and there is no
> > strict necessity to the fact then, the "the number of universes is 42"
> > is an axiom.
> Such as "the number of universes is one".
One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms.
>Besides I find very
> problematic the unicity.
Then you had better say what the problem is.
> >>and O'R could not help you choose or if it
> >> could help for something would be to choose the 0 univers
> >> hypothesis... well 0 < 1 << oo and this for all values of 0 even big
> >> ones :)
> > O's R is of course about the simplest theory that fist the evidence.
> Well then infinitely many is simpler (does not have to bother to
> explain why one and only one for ever and ever).
it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
> >> 2) Why turing emulability of the mind entails first person
> >> undeterminacy and/or MW ?
> >> Because if you're a computation then you're not dependant on the
> >> substrate of the computation... but only to the computation itself.
> > I would be directly dependent on the computation but only indirectly
> > on the substrate.
> You have no dependancy on the substrate (even indirectly), the
> substrate can change and the you computation can't notice it (so the
> direct substrate supporting the you computation may be an
> emulated.substrate running on an emulated substrate running on your
> level 0, still the you computation doesn't care.
The computation needs some sort of substrate.
> > A
> >> computation is substrate independant.
> >> Well you'd say it may be substrate independent but still it needs a
> >> substrate to 'exist'. Ok let's accept that, but let's return on the
> >> mind and on the hypothesis that the mind is a computation and the
> >> brain the substrate on which it is run. As a computation is substrate
> >> independant then what follows is if the mind is a computation it can
> >> be run on other computational substrate for example on a... computer
> >> for example. And 'the mind' wouldn't be able to tell if it is run on a
> >> brain or on a computer. By our hypothesis the mind is a computation,
> >> and a computation is
> > You have switched context here from what a computational process is
> > ontologically dependent on, to what the abstract description of an
> > algorithm is theoretically dependent n
> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> ontologically primary.
That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
argue for it.
> >>dependant only on it's state and transition rule,
> >> if the same input is given to the same algorithm it will yield the
> >> same result so seeing a brain is of no help because you would see a
> >> brain even run somewhere else if the same input is given.
> >> So why this entails first person undeterminacy and/or MW ?
> > let's
> >> assume we could replicate the computation of your mind (I have assume
> >> by hypothesis that it is a computation, so replication can be done,
> >> even if currently we don't have a clue and even we don't know if the
> >> mind is a computation... but here I assume it just for the argument to
> >> see what it entails) then I could execute the 'you' computation on a
> >> computer then if I can, I can also run the 'you' computation not only
> >> on one computer but on many computers. Ok so now I have at least two
> >> computers running the same mind (computation)... I switch off one
> >> computer, the mind die ? hell no, by our hypothesis mind is
> >> computation and the computation is still running on the other
> >> computer. So from the point of view of the mind unplugging one of the
> >> two computers didn't change a thing. Now I'm a real serail killer I
> >> switch of the last computer running the computation/mind... so now the
> >> mind die now ?? Let's say I've done a program dump before stopping the
> >> last computer and I decide 5 years later to rerun the computation from
> >> this save point and on. Wasn't the mind dead ? If it is and mind ==
> >> the computation, how can I have the ability to run the computation
> >> without it being the mind ? It means also that if you're a computation
> >> you can't know at which 'level' you're run (if you're run on a VM
> >> running in a VM running in a VM or a non emulated substrate). So if
> >> mind is a computation to make correct prediction about the next state
> >> you must take all computation having the same state into account.
> > No. If I have no reason to believe there multiple implementations,
> > there s in no indeterminacy between them. I can't be certain that
> > there ae no multiple implementations, but I can't be certain that
> > I am not being dreamt by a butterfly either. The problem with
> > sceptical arguments is that they confuse "you cannot be certain
> > that not-X" with "you can be reasonably sure that X". I am entitled
> > to reject the Yes Doctor hypotheses along with the Chuang Tze
> > hypothesis even if I cannot be certain.
> If you're a computation then you are duplicable as a computation,
DuplicABLE is not enough. I might be dreamABLE by the butterfly as
well. If I am not duplicATED there is no indeterminacy. If there
is no serious evidence of duplication, there is no serious problem
of indeterminacy -- it is just speculation like the butterfly story.
> could be seen only an engineering problem not a technical one (if
> you're a computation of course). Then either the mind is not a
> computation so we could not duplicate it (not as a computation
> actually) or it is and then it will be possible.
All sorts of things are possible that I don't worry about. Why should
>Then either the you
> computation is run once and will never and ever be rerun (on any
> substrate able to support this computation, even a sheet of paper :) )
> or it will be run more than once, then the rest follows.
There is not a scrap of evidence for the more-than-once option.
>The only way
> to be sure not to be rerun is that the mind is not a computation... It
> can't be a computation and not imply 1st person indeterminacy.
You're doing it again...putting forward "you can't be sure of not-X"
as if it means "you can be sure of X".
> > Even
> >> using the 'real switch' theory a mind could be run on different 'real'
> >> (composed of substance) substrate.
> > "Could" does not cut it. If it is not reasonably
> > plausible that there are multiple implementations, there is no
> > indeterminacy worth worrying about.
> Could... as I say the "one" univers we see is big and has plenty of time
The universe we see is nowhere near as big as the Tegmark-Marechal
Therefore you cannot possibly lever Mathematical Many Worlds out
of Physical Many Worlds.
> >>.. and the mind will *have* to take
> >> into account these runs on real substrate to make correct prediction.
> >> And unplugging one real substrate run will not kill the mind,
> >> unplugging them all also. The only way would be to not only unplug
> >> them all but to garantee that it wil *never and ever* be run *again*
> >> (even only one).
> > In reality, no-one has ever come up with a perfect duplicate of even
> > one mind. You just don't have your multiple implementations.
> Yes, but that's not the point, the point is assuming turing
> emulability of the mind/the mind is a computation hypothesis implies
> 1st person indeterminacy and hence many worlds/dreams.
False. The TE alone does not imply indeterminacy. To obtain actual
you need to get actual -- not just theoretical--implementations from
somewhere. You need the additional hypothesis of Platonism, or
> So assuming
> mind is computation we will have multiple implementations,
"Will" is nothing but a guess.
> is a computation the problem lies in an engineering problem not a
> theoretical one.
> >> If I'm run on another computational substrate than
> >> my brain, If someone pull the plug, I die ?
> Still don't think so or I'm can't be run on another substrate (ie: not
> a computation) in the first place.
That's as much faith as any religion. You do not know that someone
go to the trouble of duplicating you at some point in the future.
> Quentin Anciaux
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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