On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi, > > 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does > > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an > > ontologically > > parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence. > > Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable... > except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain > why that number (be it 1 or 42). It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard cosmology accepts that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially unaccountable boundary conditions. > Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ? The non-existence of unobserved entities. > > One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does > > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. > > Well so ? So the 0 axiom rule may be impossible to fulfill. Which would make other methodological approaches preferable. > >>Besides I find very > >> problematic the unicity. > > > Then you had better say what the problem is. > > Why one ? The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all- there-is? >why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single > universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in > it, wow lucky. Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else to be. "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking. > > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not > > fit the evidence because of the WR problem. > > Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of > the WR problem. I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch off" WR's. > > The computation needs some sort of substrate. > > *Any* substrate that can be use for doing a computation. Is a program > running in a simulated processor can know that the substrate (imagine > it has sensor to give information about it) is simulated if the > simulated processor gives out exactly what it should ? no... so the > substrate is nothing. "There is no substrate" doesn't follow from "the substrate is unknown". > >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is > >> ontologically primary. > > > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to > > argue for it. > > I do not assume them. Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. > > DuplicABLE is not enough. I might be dreamABLE by the butterfly as > > well. If I am not duplicATED there is no indeterminacy. If there > > is no serious evidence of duplication, there is no serious problem > > of indeterminacy -- it is just speculation like the butterfly story. > > If mind is a computation it's a fact that conscious computation will > be run. Why ? Says who? >If mind is not a computation on the other hand well yes mind > wouldn't be duplicable so asking for potential duplicability in these > conditions is meaningless. > > All sorts of things are possible that I don't worry about. Why should > > I? > > The question is about mind is or is not a computation and what it > entails. You are saying mind is a computation but are rejecting > multiple runs on the ground that there won't be any ever. I am not claiming to be certain that there won't be. I am saying there is no particular evidence three will be. >.. Either you > should dismiss the mind computation hypothesis or dismiss your > susbtance real switch theory, they're not compatible. They are in the absence of Multiple Instantiation and its equivalents , such as Platonism. > >>The only way > >> to be sure not to be rerun is that the mind is not a computation... It > >> can't be a computation and not imply 1st person indeterminacy. > > > You're doing it again...putting forward "you can't be sure of not-X" > > as if it means "you can be sure of X". > > No I can be sure that if mind is a computation it is a computation in > pure term and thus totally independent of the substrate. Buys you nothing without actual multiple instantiations. > > The universe we see is nowhere near as big as the Tegmark-Marechal > > Platonia. > > Therefore you cannot possibly lever Mathematical Many Worlds out > > of Physical Many Worlds. > > nowhere as big... you've seen the entire universe or only what's in > your light cone ? The fact that physics picks out a small subset of mathematics as applicable tells me that the universe we see is nowhere near as big as the Tegmark-Marechal Platonia. > >> Yes, but that's not the point, the point is assuming turing > >> emulability of the mind/the mind is a computation hypothesis implies > >> 1st person indeterminacy and hence many worlds/dreams. > > > > False. The TE alone does not imply indeterminacy. To obtain actual > > indeterminacy, > > you need to get actual -- not just theoretical--implementations from > > somewhere. You need the additional hypothesis of Platonism, or > > something else. > > Mind emulability implies indeterminacy (even for only two runs). There is no evidence of a single re-run. > > That's as much faith as any religion. You do not know that someone > > will > > go to the trouble of duplicating you at some point in the future. > > Yes so the next you is a relative state of your current computational > state, your current state + transition rule + next state is part of an > infinite number of computations. As Bruno is saying you are the trace > of all those merging computations. There is no evidence of these infinite computations. > Regards, > Quentin Anciaux > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

- Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x) Quentin Anciaux
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x) Bruno Marchal
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x) Quentin Anciaux
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (... 1Z
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everythi... Quentin Anciaux
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the ever... 1Z
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the... Quentin Anciaux
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite and... 1Z
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite... Quentin Anciaux
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite... 1Z
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite... Quentin Anciaux
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite... 1Z
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite... Quentin Anciaux
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite... 1Z
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite... Brent Meeker
- Re: Simplicity, the infinite... Quentin Anciaux