2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> >> > Then you had better say what the problem is.
>> >> Why one ?
>> > The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all-
>> > there-is?
>> Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving.
> I am not saying there is one universe. I am saying there is as many
> as are needed to explain the evidence, and no more.

You're not saying anything nor asserting something.

>> >>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single
>> >> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in
>> >> it, wow lucky.
>> > Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else
>> > to be.
>> > "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking.
>> Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the
>> everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...)
> And if there is one universe, we must be in it. Nothing could
> be less coincidental.

Sure, why one then ?

>> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
>> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
>> >> the WR problem.
>> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
>> > off" WR's.
>> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
>> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
> That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
> worlders--
> get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.
> Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
> the same, tell me how.

By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable
of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of
time...), and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are
relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only
one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking
why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because
you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :)

>> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
>> >> >> ontologically primary.
>> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
>> >> > argue for it.
>> >> I do not assume them.
>> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
>> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
>> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
>> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
>> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
>> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
>> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
>> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
>> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
>> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
> And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
> computationalism still true, and without any subjective
> indeterminacy).

If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
is a computational process then we'll build AI... you must suppose
1) the end of the world before we do it
2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible
because the mind is a computational process
3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but
dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle
or your substance for example)..

>> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will
>> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital
>> consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st
>> person indeterminacy...
> I don't have to do any of those things. I just have to point out that
> it isn't particularly likely. I could be living in a fantastically
> elaborate
> Truman-style replica of a *physical* environment..but why should I
> believe
> that?

I do not believe in that, you talk of multiverse like if it was
something built for deceiving us... that's nonsense paranoia :)

> There are many sceptical hypotheses; they are all equally
> likely, ie "not certainly false". Rationally they should be treated
> equally,
> and, since they cannot be equally true, they must be treated as
> equally implausible..

Yes and many is more rationally simpler than unicity.

Quentin Anciaux
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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