On 13 Aug, 21:47, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> When the universe will end is '17 is prime' still true ?
>
> Me winning the lotery is a WR event... I play lotery, I do not win
> therefore no one wins... It's basically your argument about WR.
>
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
> > On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >> >> Sure, why one then ?
>
> >> > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts.
>
> >> Which facts ?
>
> > The observed ones.
>
> You're talking about the microscopic quantum world ?

All the facts.

> >> >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does 
> >> >> >> >> > not
> >> >> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>
> >> >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in 
> >> >> >> >> front of
> >> >> >> >> the WR problem.
>
> >> >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
> >> >> >> > off" WR's.
>
> >> >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR 
> >> >> >> as
> >> >> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
>
> >> >> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
> >> >> > worlders--
> >> >> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.
>
> >> >> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
> >> >> > the same, tell me how.
>
> >> >> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable
> >> >> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of
> >> >> time...),
>
> >> >> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are
> >> >> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only
> >> >> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking
> >> >> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because
> >> >> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :)
>
> >> > A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the
> >> > MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined
> >> > with
> >> > theoretical complexity.
>
> >> I see real complexity in asserting the single universe.
>
> > Don't just see it, explain it.
>
> I already did, one universe put more constraint because of its unicity
> than infinitely many...

One universe is the smallest number that fits a naive subset of the
facts, such as the fact of my existence.

> >> >> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world 
> >> >> >> >> >> is
> >> >> >> >> >> ontologically primary.
>
> >> >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
> >> >> >> >> > argue for it.
>
> >> >> >> >> I do not assume them.
>
> >> >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple 
> >> >> >> > instantiations.
>
> >> >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
> >> >> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
> >> >> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious 
> >> >> >> (and
> >> >> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
> >> >> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they 
> >> >> >> won't
> >> >> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
> >> >> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
> >> >> >> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
> >> >> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
> >> >> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
>
> >> >> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
> >> >> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective
> >> >> > indeterminacy).
>
> >> >> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
> >> >> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
> >> >> is a computational process then we'll build AI....
>
> >> > There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody,
> >> > and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another
> >> > appeal to coincidence.
>
> >> i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be
> >> duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you
> >> pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out
> >> all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything
> >> ?
>
> > If you make a chain of assumptions --how willing people are to build
> > AIs, how able they are, how long the universe will support such
> > activities--
> > then you can make the AI hypothesis look likely relative to those
> > assumptions.
> > But there is no necessity there. Anyone can evade the argument by
> > rejecting the
> > assumptions. It's basically just speculation.
>
> The necessity is this... either it's possible or not possible at all,
> if it's possible it will be done. Somewhere in some time in the
> multi/universe.

That's circular. You need the multiple instantiations to support
the indeterminacy, which itself you need to support MW. So you cannot
appeal to MW to support it. (There is no clear evidence in favour of
or against an infinite
single universe either).

> >> >>you must suppose
> >> >> either
> >> >> 1) the end of the world before we do it
> >> >> 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible
> >> >> because the mind is a computational process
> >> >> 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but
> >> >> dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle
> >> >> or your substance for example)..
>
> >> > Or 4) We build an AI and it isn;t me. Why shoudl it be? The odds
> >> > are billions to one.
>
> >> I've never said that and it's not the point if it is you, me, Georges
> >> Bush or Popeye... it's about consciousness.
>
> > Nothing follows for me if someone builds and AI of someone other than
> > me.
> > If I am never duplicated, I suffer from no indeterminacy, and no issue
> > of many
> > worlds arises.I can
> > quite justifiably regard myself as a single individual in a single
> > reality.
>
> That follows that if mind is a computation it is a computation :D...
> that means it exists like any mathematical truth that exists

That's a category error. Truth is not a thing that exists, it is
an abstract property of propositions. Formalists accept
the truth of mathematical propositions but deny the existence
of mathematical objects.

> for
> ever... or do you mean a number exists only if someone composed of
> real switch particles can think of it ? and when the unirvese will end
> will 1 have 2 as successor ?

No, I don't believe in Platonism. The whole evidence
of Bruno's thinking depends on it, yet he provides barely
any justification for it.

> Regards,
> Quentin Anciaux
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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