Brent, >> The connection between moments doesn't seem like a physical >> connection; the notion is non-explanatory, since if there were such a >> physical connection we could remove it without altering the individual >> moments, therefore not altering our memories, and our subjective >> experience of time. > > How do we know that? Memories and brain processes are distributed and > parallel, > which means there are spacelike separated parts of the process - and neural > signals are orders of magnitude slower than light.
You are right-- the truth is that subjective experience occurs over time. My point was really that supposing a physical connection doesn't actually answer the question... it seems like it is equivalent to simply taking "time" as a notion that cannot be defined in terms of more basic terms. --Abram On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 2:38 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Abram Demski wrote: >> Bruno, >> >> It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the >> definition of time... >> >> Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it. >> >> Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie >> billboards next to the train track, there is no longer a normal >> temporal relationship between mental moments. There must merely be a >> "time-like" relationship, which Alice experiences as time. But, then, >> we are saying that wherever a logical relationship exists that is >> time-like, there is subjective time for those inside the time-like >> relationship. >> >> Now, what might constitute a time-like relationship? I see several >> alternatives, but none seem satisfactory. >> >> At any given moment, all we can be directly aware of is that one >> moment. If we remember the past, that is because at the present moment >> our brain has those memories; we don't know if they "really" came from >> the past. What would it mean to put moments in a series? It changes >> nothing essential about the moment itself; we can remove the past, >> because it adds nothing. > > You raise some good points. I think the crux of the problem comes from > chopping > a process up into "moments" and assuming that these infinitesimal, frozen > slices > preserve all that is necessary for time. It is essentially the same as > assuming > there is a "subsitution level" below which we can ignore causality and just > talk > about states. It seems like a obvious idea, but it is contrary to quantum > mechanics and unitary evolution under the Schrodinger equation which was the > basis for the whole idea of a multiverse and "everything happens". > > >> >> The connection between moments doesn't seem like a physical >> connection; the notion is non-explanatory, since if there were such a >> physical connection we could remove it without altering the individual >> moments, therefore not altering our memories, and our subjective >> experience of time. > > How do we know that? Memories and brain processes are distributed and > parallel, > which means there are spacelike separated parts of the process - and neural > signals are orders of magnitude slower than light. > > Brent > >>Similarly, can it be a logical relationship? Is it >> the structure of a single moment that connects it to the next? How >> would this be? Perhaps we require that there is some function (a >> "physics") from one moment to the next? But, this does not exactly >> allow for things like relativity in which there is no single universal >> clock. Of course, relativity could be simulated, creating a universe >> that was run be a universal clock but whose internal facts did not >> depend on which universal clock, exactly, the simulation was run from. >> My problem is, I suppose, that any particular definition of "timelike >> relationship" seems too arbitrary. As another example, should any >> probabilistic elements be allowed into physics? In this case, we don't >> have a function any more, but a relation-- perhaps a relation of >> weighted transitions. But how would this relation make any difference >> from inside the universe? >> >> --Abram >> >> On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> MGA 3 >>> >>> It is the last MGA ! >>> >>> I realize MGA is complete, as I thought it was, but I was doubting this >>> recently. We don't need to refer to Maudlin, and MGA 4 is not necessary. >>> Maudlin 1989 is an independent argument of the 1988 Toulouse argument (which >>> I present here). >>> Note that Maudlin's very interesting "Olympization technic" can be used to >>> defeat a wrong form of MGA 3, that is, a wrong argument for the assertion >>> that the movie cannot be conscious. (the argument that the movie lacks the >>> counterfactual). Below are hopefully correct (if not very simple) argument. >>> ( I use Maudlin sometimes when people gives this non correct form of MGA 3, >>> and this is probably what makes me think Maudlin has to be used, at some >>> point). >>> >>> >>> >>> MGA 1 shows that Lucky Alice is conscious, and MGA 2 shows that the >>> "luckiness" feature of the MGA 1 experiment was a red herring. We can >>> construct, from MEC+COMP, an home made lucky rays generator, and use it at >>> will. If we accept both digital mechanism, in particular Dennet's principle >>> that neurons have no intelligence, still less prescience, and this >>> *together with* the supervenience principle; we have to accept that Alice >>> conscious dream experience supervenes on the projection of her brain >>> activity movie. >>> >>> Let us show now that Alice consciousness *cannot* supervene on that >>> *physical* movie projection. >>> >>> >>> I propose two (deductive) arguments. >>> >>> 1) >>> >>> Mechanism implies the following tautological functionalist principle: if, >>> for some range of activity, a system does what it is supposed to do, and >>> this before and after a change is made in its constitution, then the change >>> does not change what the system is supposed to do, for that range of >>> activity. >>> Example: >>> - A car is supposed to broken but only if the driver is faster than 90 >>> miles/h. Pepe Pepito NEVER drives faster than 80 miles/h. Then the car is >>> supposed to do what she is supposed to do, with respect of its range of >>> activity defined by Pepe Pepito. >>> - Claude bought a 1000 thousand processors computer. One day he realized >>> that he used only 990 processors, for his type of activity, so he decided to >>> get rid of those 10 useless processors. And indeed the machine will satisfy >>> Claude ever. >>> >>> - Alice has (again) a math exam. Theoreticians have correctly predict that >>> in this special circumstance, she will never use neurons X, Y and Z. Now >>> Alice go (again, again) to this exam in the same condition, but with the >>> neurons X, Y, Z removed. Again, not only will she behaved like if she >>> succeed her exam, but her consciousness, with both MEC *and* MAT still >>> continue. >>> The idea is that if something is not useful, for an active process to go on, >>> for some range of activity, then you can remove it, for that range of >>> activity. >>> >>> OK? >>> >>> Now, consider the projection of the movie of the activity of Alice's brain, >>> "the movie graph". >>> Is it necessary that someone look at that movie? Certainly not. No more than >>> it is needed that someone is look at your reconstitution in Moscow for you >>> to be conscious in Moscow after a teleportation. All right? (with MEC >>> assumed of course). >>> Is it necessary to have a screen? Well, the range of activity here is just >>> one dynamical description of one computation. Suppose we make a hole in the >>> screen. What goes in and out of that hole is exactly the same, with the hole >>> and without the hole. For that unique activity, the hole in the screen is >>> functionally equivalent to the subgraph which the hole removed. Clearly we >>> can make a hole as large as the screen, so no need for a screen. >>> But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film itself. >>> Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film itself, you get >>> a "hole" in the movie, but everything which enters and go out of the hole >>> remains the same, for that (unique) range of activity. The "hole" has >>> trivially the same functionality than the subgraph functionality whose >>> special behavior was described by the film. And this is true for any >>> subparts, so we can remove the entire film itself. >>> >>> Does Alice's dream supervene (in real time and space) on the projection of >>> the empty movie? >>> >>> Remark. >>> 1° Of course, this argument can be sum up by saying that the movie lacks >>> causality between its parts so that it cannot really be said that it >>> computes any thing, at least physically. The movie is just an ordered record >>> of computational states. This is neither a physical computation, nor an >>> (immaterial) computation where the steps follows relatively to some >>> universal machine. It is just a description of a computation, already >>> existing in the Universal Deployment. >>> 2° Note this: If we take into consideration the relative destiny of Alice, >>> and supposing one day her brain broke down completely, she has more chance >>> to survive through "holes in the screen" than to the "holes in the film". >>> The film contains the relevant information to reconstitute Alice from her >>> brain description, contained on this high resolution film. Keeping comp, and >>> abandoning the physical supervenience thesis, means that we do no more >>> associate consciousness, neither on the movie, NOR on the brain special >>> activity in a computation, but to the computation itself directly. A brain, >>> and even a film, will "only" be a way to make bigger the probability >>> for a consciousness to manifest itself relatively to a "probable" universal >>> computational history. >>> Strictly speaking, running the movie dimimish Alice chance to have her >>> conscious experience (life) continue, at least relatively to you, because of >>> the many scratches the projector makes on the pellicle, which remove >>> relevant information for a safe reconstitution later (again relatively to >>> you). >>> >>> >>> 2) >>> >>> I give now what is perhaps a simpler argument >>> >>> A projection of a movie is a relative phenomenon. On the planet 247a, nearby >>> in the galaxy, they don't have screen. The film pellicle is as big as a >>> screen, and they make the film passing behind a stroboscope at the right >>> frequency in front of the public. But on planet 247b, movies are only for >>> travellers! They dress their film, as big as those on planet 247a, in their >>> countries all along their train rails with a lamp besides each frames, which >>> is nice because from the train, through its speed, you get the usual 24 >>> frames per second. But we already accepted that such movie does not need to >>> be observed, the train can be empty of people. Well the train does not play >>> any role, and what remains is the static film with a lamp behind each frame. >>> Are the lamps really necessaries? Of course not, all right? So now we are >>> obliged to accept that the consciousness of Alice during the projection of >>> the movie supervenes of something completely inert in time and space. This >>> contradicts the *physical* supervenience thesis. >>> >>> >>> Exercises. >>> >>> a) Someone could propose an alternate argument that a movie does not compute >>> (and so consciousness does supervene on it) by alluding to the lack of >>> causality in the movie: the movie does not handle the counterfactual >>> existing implicitly in computations (physical or not). Use Maudlin's >>> Olympization technic to refute that argument. >>> b) Make fun by using a non dreaming Alice. Shows that the movie (film or >>> screen) graph border is needed to get the accidental zombies (the puppet). >>> >>> And then the "important" exercise (the original goal). >>> c) Eliminate the hypothesis "there is a concrete deployment" in the seventh >>> step of the UDA. Use UDA(1...7) to define properly the computationalist >>> supervenience thesis. Hint: reread the remarks above. >>> Have a good day. >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >> >> > >> > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
