Hi Bruno, >> So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative >> argument against materialism, correct? > > It seems to me you were going in that direction, yes. >
Well, *I* was suggesting that we run up against the problem of time in *either* direction (physical reality / mathematical reality); so the real problem would be a naive view of time, rather than COMP + MAT. But, you are probably right: the problem really only applies to MAT. On the other hand, I might try to take up the argument again after reading UDA. :) > With the MEC hypothesis, a "believer" in comp "go to hell". (Where a > "believer"in , is someone who takes p for granted). > Comp, is like self-consistency, a self-observing machine can guess it, > hope it, (or fear it), but can never take it for granted. It *is* > theological. No machine can prove its theology, but Löbian machine can > study the complete theology of more simple Löbian machines, find the > invariant for the consistent extensions, and lift it to themselves, > keeping consistency by "consciously" being aware that this is has to > be taken as an interrogation, it is not for granted, so that saying > "yes" to the doctor needs an act of faith, and never can be imposed. > (Of course we can argue biology has already "bet" on it). Yes, this is fundamentally interesting :). > Maudlin shows that for a special computation, which supports in time > some consciousness (by using the (physical) supervenience thesis), you > can build a device doing the same computation with much less physical > activity, actually with almost no physical activity at all. The > natural reply is that such a machine has no more the right > counterfactual behavior. Then Maudlin shows that you can render the > counterfactual correctness to such machine by adding, what will be for > the special computation, just inert material. > But this give to inert material something which plays no role, or > would give prescience to elementary material in computations; from > which you can conclude that MEC and MAT does not works well together. I am not sure this convinces me. If the "inert" material is useful to the computation in the counterfactual situations, then it is useful, cannot be removed. > Abram, are you aware that Godel's incompleteness follows "easily" (= > in few lines) from Church thesis? Not the second theorem, but the > first, even a stronger form of the first. No, I do not know that one. >> --Abram --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
