On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> MGA 3

...

> But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film  
> itself. Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film  
> itself, you get a "hole" in the movie, but everything which enters and  
> go out of the hole remains the same, for that (unique) range of  
> activity.  The "hole" has trivially the same functionality than the  
> subgraph functionality whose special behavior was described by the  
> film. And this is true for any subparts, so we can remove the entire  
> film itself.
> 

I don't think this step follows at all. Consciousness may supervene on
the stationary unprojected film, but if you start making holes in it,
you will eventually get a film on a nonconscious entity. At some
point, the consciousness is no longer supervening on the film (but may
well be supervening on other films that haven't been so adulterated,
or on running machines or whatever...

> Does Alice's dream supervene (in real time and space) on the  
> projection of the empty movie?
> 

No.

> 
> 2)
> 
> I give now what is perhaps a simpler argument
> 
> A projection of a movie is a relative phenomenon. On the planet 247a,  
> nearby in the galaxy, they don't have screen. The film pellicle is as  
> big as a screen, and they make the film passing behind a stroboscope  
> at the right frequency in front of the public. But on planet 247b,  
> movies are only for travellers! They dress their film, as big as those  
> on planet 247a, in their countries all along their train rails with a  
> lamp besides each frames, which is nice because from the train,  
> through its speed, you get the usual 24 frames per second. But we  
> already accepted that such movie does not need to be observed, the  
> train can be empty of people. Well the train does not play any role,  
> and what remains is the static film with a lamp behind each frame. Are  
> the lamps really necessaries? Of course not, all right? So now we are  
> obliged to accept that the consciousness of Alice during the  
> projection of the movie supervenes of something completely inert in  
> time and space. This contradicts the *physical*  supervenience thesis.
> 

But the physics that Alice experiences will be fully dynamic. She will
experience time, and non-inert processes that she is supervening on.

Why does the physical supervenience require that all instantiations of
a consciousness be dynamic? Surely, it suffices that some are?

> 
> c) Eliminate the hypothesis "there is a concrete deployment" in the  
> seventh step of the UDA. Use UDA(1...7) to define properly the  
> computationalist supervenience thesis. Hint: reread the remarks above.

I have no problems with this conclusion. However, we cannot eliminate
supervenience on phenomenal physics, n'est-ce pas?


-- 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics                              
UNSW SYDNEY 2052                         [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia                                http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to