Colin, I have several problems with that paper-- I think the reasoning is sloppy in several places. Most importantly, I don't agree with his formalization of the argument. My primary objection to that formalization is similar to the objection he deals with in section 4-- the argument employs multiple senses of the word "possible", so to formalize it we need to employ an additional operator, such as the "physical possibility" that he chooses. To this objection, he responds by arguing that it certainly *seems* physically possible (since one can imagine a zombie), and so the burden of proof lies on those who would claim that it is not physically possible. To this I would reply that he is backing off to conceptual possibility again-- it is conceptually possible that it is physically possible. That is all well and good, but it does not allow the proof to go through; it still lets computationalism rest, as one of several conceptual possibilities. To make the proof go through, we'd need to directly assume the physical possibility, which is tantamount to just assuming that computationalism is false-- so the proof doesn't add much.
--Abram On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 8:25 PM, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Hi, > Computationalsim pronounced dead here: > Bringsjord, S. (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception > of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LIX(1), 41-69. > cheers > colin > > > Kim Jones wrote: >> A representation of a thing (say MGA) is as good (ie as authentic) as >> the thing being represented. >> >> Yes? >> >> Autrement dit: >> >> >> there is no especial difference between the movie and the subject (of >> the movie) - where the movie is a more or less "complete" (whatever >> that means) representation of the subject >> >> >> I have always FELT this to be true >> >> Guys, >> >> >> There is a great need to SIMPLIFY all this stuff for dummies like me >> >> >> Somebody please write "The Dummie's Guide to the Computationalist >> Hypothesis" >> >> >> You stand to make beaucoup de fric >> >> >> K >> >> >> >> > >> > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---