Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in
platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts:
Brent Meeker wrote:
>But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an
>assumption that digitally represented states form a sequence just
>is a rule that defines that sequence, but in fact all digital (and
>sequences depend on causal chains.
> I have an intuition that causality
>(or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for
>consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional
>Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox to Lucky Firefox)
>indicates that there's something wrong with this idea. However, you
>have an intuition that order is somehow important for consciousness.
But we must realise that causality is a concept that is deeply related
(cognitively, in humans) to time and physical change.
But both time and space _emerge_ only from the inside view (1st person
or 1st person shareable) in the sum over all computations.
In Platonia (viewed, for the time being, ludicrously and impossibly,
from the outside) - there is no notion of time, space, sequentiality,
before and after.
The very notion of causation must be one that arises only in the inside
view, as a "succession" of consistent patterns.
In a sense, order (shareable histories) must arise from the Platonic
Eternal Mess (chaos) -> somehow along the lines of self-organization maybe:
In this sense, the computations would "assemble themselves" to
>in Platonia consciousness does not supervene on description of the
>computation, even if those description are 100% precise and correct
Hmm, I understand the difference between description and computation in
maths and logic, and also in real world, but I do not know if this still
makes sense in Platonia -> viewed from the acausal perspective outlined
above. Well maybe in the sense that in some histories there will be
platonic descriptions that are not conscious.
But in other histories those descriptions will be computations and
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