No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this
case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as
if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if
someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the
recording didn't account for, then she may or may not become conscious
of the fact of her partial consciousness-- in that case it would be
very much like brain damage.

Anyway, yes, I am admitting that the film of the graph lacks
counterfactuals and is therefore not conscious. My earlier splitting
of the argument into an argument about (1) and a separate argument
against (2) was perhaps a bit silly, because the objection to (2) went
far enough back that it was also an objection to (1). I split the
argument like that just because I saw an independent flaw in the
reasoning of (1)... anyway...

Basically, I am claiming that there is a version of COMP+MAT that MGA
is not able to derive a contradiction from. The version goes something
like this:

"Yes, consciousness supervenes on computation, but that computation
needs to actually take place (meaning, physically). Otherwise, how
could consciousness supervene on it? Now, in order for a computation
to be physically instantiated, the physical instantiation needs to
satisfy a few properties. One of these properties is clearly some sort
of isomorphism between the computation and the physical instantiation:
the actual steps of the computation are represented in physical form.
A less obvious requirement is that the physical computation needs to
have the proper counterfactuals: if some external force were to modify
some step in the computation, the computation must progress according
to the new computational state (as translated by the isomorphism)."


On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Abram,
> My answer would have to be, no, she lacks the necessary counterfactual
> behaviors during that time.
> ? The film of the graph lacks also the counterfactuals.
> And, moreover, if only part of the brain
> were being run by a recording
> ... which lacks the counterfactual, ...
> then she would lack only some
> counterfactuals,
> I don't understand. The recording lacks all the counterfactuals. You can
> recover them from inert material, true, but this is true for the empty graph
> too (both in dream and awake situations).
> and so she would count as partially conscious.
> Hmmm .... Can she be conscious that she is partially conscious? I mean is it
> like after we drink alcohol or something?
> Bruno
> >

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