On Nov 30, 2008, at 10:14 AM, Günther Greindl wrote:
> I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3.

I still find the whole thing easier to grasp when presented in terms  
of cellular automata.

Let's say we have a computer program that starts with a large but  
finite 2D grid of bits, and then iterates the rules to some CA  
(Conway's Life, Critters, whatever) on that grid a large but finite  
number of times, and stores all of the resulting computations in  
memory, so that we have a 3D block universe in memory. And lets say  
that the resulting block universe contains patterns that MECH-MAT  
would say are conscious.

If we believe that consciousness supervenes on the physical act of  
"playing back" the data in our block universe like a movie, then we  
have a problem. Because before we play back the movie, we can fill any  
portions of the block universe we want with zeros. So then our played  
back movie can contain "conscious" creatures who are walking around  
with (say) zeros where their visual cortexes should be, or their high- 
level brain functions should be, etc. In other words, we have a fading  
qualia problem (which we have also called a "partial zombie" problem  
in these threads).

I find the argument compelling as far as it goes. But I'm not  
convinced that all or most actual, real-world mechanist-materialists  
believe that consciousness supervenes on the physical act of playing  
back the stored computations. Bruno indicates that it must, by the  
logical definitions of MECH and MAT. This just makes me feel like I  
don't really understand the logical definitions of MECH and MAT.

-- Kory


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