On 30 Nov 2008, at 19:14, Günther Greindl wrote:

> Hello Bruno,
> I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3.
> With MGA 1 and 2, I would say that, with MEC+MAT, also the the
> projection of the movie (and Lucky Alice in 1) are conscious - because
> it supervenes on the physical activity.
> MEC says: it's the computation that counts, not the substrate.
> MAT says: we need some substrate to perform a computation. In MGA 1  
> and
> 2 we have substrates (neurons or optical boolean graph that performs  
> the
> computation).
> Now in MGA 3 you say:
>> Now, consider the projection of the movie of the activity of Alice's
>> brain, "the movie graph".
>> Is it necessary that someone look at that movie? Certainly not.
> Agreed.
>> Is it necessary to have a screen? Well, the range of activity here is
>> just one dynamical description of one computation. Suppose we make a
>> hole in the screen. What goes in and out of that hole is exactly the
>> same, with the hole and without the hole. For that unique activity,  
>> the
>> hole in the screen is functionally equivalent to the subgraph which  
>> the
>> hole removed.
> We can remove those optical boolean nodes which are not relevant for  
> the
>  caterpillar dream
>> Clearly we can make a hole as large as the screen, so no
>> need for a screen.
> but no! Then we wouldn't have a substrate anymore.

Oh( That is not true! We still have the projector and the film. We can  
project the movie in the air or directly in your eyes.
I agree for this for this when the film itself is made empty, but then  
I can recover a conterfactually correct computation by adding inert  

> You are dropping MAT
> at this step,

No. Only when I got that Alice's consciousness supervene on the empty  
film (with or without inert material).

> not leading MEC+MAT to a contradiction.
>> But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film  
>> itself.
>> Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film itself,  
>> you
>> get a "hole" in the movie, but everything which enters and go out  
>> of the
>> hole remains the same, for that (unique) range of activity.  The  
>> "hole"
>> has trivially the same functionality than the subgraph functionality
>> whose special behavior was described by the film. And this is true  
>> for
>> any subparts, so we can remove the entire film itself.
> We can talk about this part after I understand why you can drop our
> optical boolean network *grin*

it is really something people have to meditate. I could have conclude  
in the absurdity of MAT (with MEC) at MGA 2. It is hard for me to take  
people seriously when they argue that the consciousness of Alice  
supervenes on a movie of its brain activity. There is no causality,  
nor computations, during the *projection* of the movie. Alice's  
experience is related to ALL computations going through those states,  
not to descriptions of those states which can been made and collected  
in other histories. Locally it makes sense to ascribe *that*  
consciousness when you have the mean to interpret (through some  
universal machine) her computational states.

[Consciousness of (x,t)] is never [physical states] at (x,t)

it is:

[Consciousness of (x,t)] is always all computational states (in the UD 
°) corresponding to that experience. (It is an indexical view of  

And computational states can be defined by true platonic relation  
between numbers. (The usual way is done with Kleene predicate).



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