On 30 Nov 2008, at 19:17, Abram Demski wrote:
> No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this
> case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as
> if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if
> someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the
> recording didn't account for, then she may or may not become conscious
> of the fact of her partial consciousness-- in that case it would be
> very much like brain damage.
A very serious brain damage!
> Anyway, yes, I am admitting that the film of the graph lacks
> counterfactuals and is therefore not conscious.
> My earlier splitting
> of the argument into an argument about (1) and a separate argument
> against (2) was perhaps a bit silly, because the objection to (2) went
> far enough back that it was also an objection to (1). I split the
> argument like that just because I saw an independent flaw in the
> reasoning of (1)... anyway...
> Basically, I am claiming that there is a version of COMP+MAT that MGA
> is not able to derive a contradiction from. The version goes something
> like this:
> "Yes, consciousness supervenes on computation, but that computation
> needs to actually take place (meaning, physically). Otherwise, how
> could consciousness supervene on it?
Yes but with UDA the contrary happens. Even if a material world, the
question becomes: how could consciousness remain attached on this
(It is simpler to understand this issue by supposing some concrete
universal deployment in the "real" universe, and this provides the
motivation for MGA. the concreteness of the UD is a red herring.
You seem to forget that the MAT mind-body problem is not solved. I
mean this is what all experts in the field agree on. To invoke matter
to have something on which consciousness can supervene on, seems to me
a "gap explanation". It introduces more mystery than needed.
> Now, in order for a computation
> to be physically instantiated, the physical instantiation needs to
> satisfy a few properties. One of these properties is clearly some sort
> of isomorphism between the computation and the physical instantiation:
> the actual steps of the computation are represented in physical form.
> A less obvious requirement is that the physical computation needs to
> have the proper counterfactuals: if some external force were to modify
> some step in the computation, the computation must progress according
> to the new computational state (as translated by the isomorphism)."
You will be led to difficulties, like giving a computational role to
inert material. It is ok, because it saves the counterfactual (and
thus MEC), but on the price of attributing a flow of conscious
experience (in real time) to inert material. I can't swallow that,
especially if the motivation is going back to the unsolved problems of
mind, matter and their relations.
By dropping MAT, we have an explanation of consciousness or of the
reason why numbers, due to their true relations with many other
numbers, can develop from inside stable (from their views) believes on
reality and realities including, evidences can be found, physical
realities. Numbers, or combinators, etc.
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