It sounds like what you are saying in this reply is that my version of
COMP+MAT is consistent, but counter to your intuition (because you
cannot see how consciousness could be attached to physical stuff). If
this is the case, then it sounds like MGA only works for specific
versions of MAT-- say, versions of MAT that claim consciousness hinges
only on the matter, not on the causal relationships. In other words,
what G√ľnther called NMAT. So you need a different argument against--
let's call it CMAT, for causal MAT. The olympization argument only
works if COMP+CMAT can be shown to imply the removability of inert
matter... which I don't think it can, because that inert matter here
has a causal role to play in the counterfactuals, and is therefore
essential to the physical computation.


On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi Abram,
> On 30 Nov 2008, at 19:17, Abram Demski wrote:
>> Bruno,
>> No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this
>> case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as
>> if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if
>> someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the
>> recording didn't account for, then she may or may not become conscious
>> of the fact of her partial consciousness-- in that case it would be
>> very much like brain damage.
> A very serious brain damage!
>> Anyway, yes, I am admitting that the film of the graph lacks
>> counterfactuals and is therefore not conscious.
> OK.
>> My earlier splitting
>> of the argument into an argument about (1) and a separate argument
>> against (2) was perhaps a bit silly, because the objection to (2) went
>> far enough back that it was also an objection to (1). I split the
>> argument like that just because I saw an independent flaw in the
>> reasoning of (1)... anyway...
>> Basically, I am claiming that there is a version of COMP+MAT that MGA
>> is not able to derive a contradiction from. The version goes something
>> like this:
>> "Yes, consciousness supervenes on computation, but that computation
>> needs to actually take place (meaning, physically). Otherwise, how
>> could consciousness supervene on it?
> Yes but with UDA the contrary happens. Even if a material world, the
> question becomes:  how could consciousness remain attached on this
> matter.
> (It is simpler to understand this issue by supposing some concrete
> universal deployment in the "real" universe, and this provides the
> motivation for MGA. the concreteness of the UD is a red herring.
> You seem to forget that the MAT mind-body problem is not solved. I
> mean this is what all experts in the field agree on. To invoke matter
> to have something on which consciousness can supervene on, seems to me
> a "gap explanation". It introduces more mystery than needed.
>> Now, in order for a computation
>> to be physically instantiated, the physical instantiation needs to
>> satisfy a few properties. One of these properties is clearly some sort
>> of isomorphism between the computation and the physical instantiation:
>> the actual steps of the computation are represented in physical form.
>> A less obvious requirement is that the physical computation needs to
>> have the proper counterfactuals: if some external force were to modify
>> some step in the computation, the computation must progress according
>> to the new computational state (as translated by the isomorphism)."
> You will be led to difficulties, like giving a computational role to
> inert material. It is ok, because it saves the counterfactual (and
> thus MEC), but on the price of attributing a flow of conscious
> experience (in real time) to inert material. I can't swallow that,
> especially if the motivation is going back to the unsolved problems of
> mind, matter and their relations.
> By dropping MAT, we have an explanation of consciousness or of the
> reason why numbers, due to their true relations with many other
> numbers, can develop from inside stable (from their views) believes on
> reality and realities including, evidences can be found, physical
> realities. Numbers, or combinators, etc.
> Bruno
> >

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to