Why does MGA 2 show that SMAT + MEC is inconsistent?

The way I see it, SMAT + MEC should say that a recording of Alice does
not count as conscious, because it lacks the proper causal structure
(or equivalently, the proper counterfactual behavior).


On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:53 PM, Günther Greindl
> Hi Bruno,
>>> but no! Then we wouldn't have a substrate anymore.
>> Oh( That is not true! We still have the projector and the film. We can
>> project the movie in the air or directly in your eyes.
> Ok I see now where our intuitions differ (always the problem with
> thought experiment) - but maybe we can clear this up and see where it
> leads...
>> it is really something people have to meditate. I could have conclude
>> in the absurdity of MAT (with MEC) at MGA 2. It is hard for me to take
>> people seriously when they argue that the consciousness of Alice
>> supervenes on a movie of its brain activity. There is no causality,
>> nor computations, during the *projection* of the movie.
> If that is how you see MAT (you require causality) - then I would also
> agree -> MGA 2 shows absurdity.
>> experience is related to ALL computations going through those states,
>> not to descriptions of those states which can been made and collected
>> in other histories. Locally it makes sense to ascribe *that*
>> consciousness when you have the mean to interpret (through some
>> universal machine) her computational states.
> That is already part of your theory (UDA and all) (as I understand it),
> but not included already in COMP or in MAT.
>> [Consciousness of (x,t)] is never [physical states] at (x,t)
> For me, the above expresses the essence of (naive) MAT -> let's call it
> So, clearly:
> NMAT: [Consciousness of (x,t)] supervenes on [physical states] at (x,t)
> And on physical states only! Not on the causal relations of these states
> (block universe view).
> Your argument goes like this:
>> it is:
>> [Consciousness of (x,t)] is always all computational states (in the UD
>> °) corresponding to that experience. (It is an indexical view of
>> reality).
> And I share it IF we can show that MAT+MEC is inconsistent. But I am not
> convinced yet.
> For me, the essence of MEC (COMP) is this:
> COMP: there is a level at which a person can be substituted at a digital
> level (we don't have to go down to "infinity"), and where this digital
> description is enough to reconsitute this person elsewhere and elsewhen,
> independent of substrate.
> NMAT additionally requires that the substrate for COMP be some
> "mysterious" substance, and not only a platonic relation.
> My intuition tells me this can't be -> we have to drop either MEC or NMAT.
> But MGA 3, when dropping the boolean gates, violates NMAT, because:
> NMAT: [Consciousness of (x,t)] supervenes on [physical states] at (x,t)
> And the physical states relevant where the _states of the boolean graph_
> (the movie projector was just the lucky cosmic ray).
> Do you have different definition for MAT? Do you require causal dynamics
> for MAT?
> The problem with NMAT as I define it raises the issue as in the Putnam
> paper -> does every rock implement every finite state-automaton?
> Chalmers makes the move to implementation, so introduces causal dynamics.
> So, sophisticated MAT would probably be:
> SMAT: [Consciousness of (x,t)] supervenes on [physical states] at (x,t)
> over a timespan delta(t) _if_ sufficiently complex causal dynamics are
> at work during this timespan relating the physical states.
> Then I would say: MGA 2 (already) shows that SMAT+MEC are not
> compatible. No need for MGA 3.
> For NMAT+MEC (which is problematic for other reasons) MGA 3 is not
> convincing.
> Would you agree with this?
> Cheers,
> Günther
> >

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