Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Abram,
> 
> On 02 Dec 2008, at 20:33, Abram Demski wrote:
> 
>> Bruno,
>>
>> I am a bit confused. To me, you said
>>
>>> Or, you are weakening the physical supervenience
>>> thesis by appeal to a notion of causality which seems to me a bit
>>> magical, and contrary to the local functionalism of the
>>> computationalist.
>> This seems to say that the version of MAT that MGA is targeted at does
>> not include causal requirements.
> 
> 
> MAT is the usual idea that there is a physical world described through  
> physical laws. Those capture physical causality, generally under the  
> form of differential equations. If there were no causality in physics,  
> the very notion of physical supervenience would not make sense. Nor MEC 
> +MAT, at the start. Sorry if I have been unclear, but I was  
> criticizing only the *magical* causality which is necessary for  
> holding both the physical supervenience thesis and the mechanist  
> hypothesis, like attribution of prescience to the neurons (in MGA 1),  
> or attributing a computational role in inert Material.

This seems to assume there is causality apart from physical causality, but 
there 
is no causality in logic or mathematics (except in a metaphorical, I might say 
"magical", sense).  So I don't see that Gunther is relying on anything magical.

Brent

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to