> PS Abram. I think I will have to meditate a bit longer on your
> (difficult) post. You may have a point (hopefully only pedagogical :)
A little bit more commentary may be in order then... I think my point
may be halfway between pedagogical and serious...
What I am saying is that people will come to the argument with some
vague idea of which computations (or which physical entities) they
pick out as "conscious". They will compare this to the various
hypotheses that come along during the argument-- MAT, MEC, MAT + MEC,
"Lucky Alice is conscious", "Lucky Alice is not conscious", et
cetera... These notions are necessarily 3rd-person in nature. It seems
like there is a problem there. Your argument is designed to talk about
If a 1st-person-perspective is a sort of structure (computational
and/or physical), what type of structure is it? If we define it in
terms of behavior only, then a recording is fine. If we define it in
terms of inner workings, then a recording is probably not fine, but we
introduce "magical" dependence on things that shouldn't matter to
us... ie, we should not care if we are interacting with a perfectly
orchestrated recording, so long as to us the result is the same.
It seems like this is independent of the differences between
pure-comp / comp+mat.
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