Stathis, Yes, you are right. My main point is to show that such a point of view is possible, not to actually argue for it... but I am largely just asserting my intuitions nonetheless.
--Abram On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 4:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > 2008/12/6 Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > >> The causal structure of a recording still looks far different from the >> causal structure of a person that happens to follow a recording and >> also happens to be wired to a machine that will kill them if they >> deviate. Or, even, correct them if they deviate. (Let's go with that >> so that I can't point out the simplistic difference "a recording will >> not die if some external force causes it to deviate".) >> >> 1. Realistic malfunctions of a machine playing a recording are far >> different from realistic malfunctions of the person-machine-combo. The >> person inherits the possible malfunctions of the machine, *plus* >> malfunctions in which the machine fails to modify the person's >> behavior to match the recording. (A malfunction can be defined in >> terms of cause-effect counterfactuals in two ways: first, if we think >> that cause/effect is somewhat probabilistic, we will think that any >> machine will occasionally malfunction; second, varying external >> factors can cause malfunctions.) >> >> 2. Even during normal functioning, the cause/effect structure is very >> different; the person-combo will have a lot of extra structure, since >> it has a functioning brain and a corrective mechanism, neither needed >> for the recording. >> >> Also-- the level of the correction matters quite a bit I think. If >> only muscle actions are being corrected, the person seems obviously >> conscious-- lots of computations (& corresponding causal structure) is >> still going on.. If each neuron is corrected, this is not so >> intuitively obvious. (I suppose my intuition says that the person >> would lose consciousness when the first correction occurred, though >> that is silly upon reflection.) > > Yes, there are these differences, but why should the differences be > relevant to the question of whether consciousness occurs or not? And > what about the case where the extra machinery that would allow the > right sort of causal structure but isn't actually used in a particular > situation is temporarily disengaged? > > It seems to me that everyone contributing to these threads has an > intuition about consciousness, then works backwards from this: > "obviously, recordings aren't conscious; now what are the qualities > that recordings have which distinguish them from entities that are > conscious?". There's nothing intrinsically wrong with this method, but > it is possible to reach an impasse when the different parties have > different intuitions. > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
