Abram,

On 23 Dec 2008, at 00:23, Abram Demski wrote:

> I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I
> am saying that the "I" is a convenient fiction.


All right. It is a normal tendency for scientist. It is like wanting  
to see Platonia from outside. It is like deciding to believe only in  
the third person description view, abstracting away our experiences  
and subjectivity. Then the "I", free-will, decisions, and eventually  
"consciousness" are explained  ... away.


>
>
>> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when
>> you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink
>> coffee.
>
> Maybe "We love coffee, so we will drink coffee" (with "we" referring
> to many moment-selves).

Does your "we" includes my "we" ?



> Or, perhaps, "Abram loves coffee, so Abram
> will drink coffee" (no identification of a self, only of an identity).

Almost like a regression. To hide the first person data, you have to  
change the language. You are very coherent (as "time-skeptic"). OK.


>
>
>> It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this
>> sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you
>> did'nt, you are the copy.
>
> Since all possible moments exist, that old self did not die.

Again, you talk like if you are seeing the whole platonia. But I think  
that none of you are an observer-moment. You are inextricably linked  
to time. You are an observer moment embedded in a set of observer  
moments with a proximity relation among them.



> My
> after-reading consciousness can observe that it is not the
> before-reading consciousness, and  the before-reading consciousness
> could observe that it is not the after-reading consciousness, but that
> is all. There is no switching from one to the other, since that would
> require time (which does not exist). :)

Nice. You give me the opportunity to (re)define time: it is the  
switching from one to the other. The switching can be defined  
eventually by the relation among numbers which captures the universal  
computational dependency. Time is a creation of the first person. Look  
at the occidental Brouwer or the oriental Dogen for analysis of  
consciousness in term of time creation.


>
>
> Of course, that is where I-as-time-skeptic have trouble knowing what
> it means to choose.

Not a good thing before Christmas !



> I can understand being-in-a-state-of-choosing, but
> I refuse to accept the cause/effect reasoning that gos along with that
> state. (In other words, I can understand choosing from the 3rd person
> perspective, but cannot understand it from the 1st person
> perspective.)


No machine can. No bodies can know from inside who the chooser really  
is. That is perhaps why the meditation on the question "who am I" (cf  
Ramana Maharshi) can lead to the "enlightenment". That is probably why  
in the eastern "art of the war", people learns to not-decide, yet act.

Bruno




>
>
> --Abram
>
> On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>  
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> I wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Abram wrote
>>>>
>>>> --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not
>>>> minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing  
>>>> the
>>>> number of my copies that will be so carried.
>>>
>>> ?
>>
>>
>> OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism?  And  *you* (in your
>> sense) you die.
>> Is this what you mean?
>>
>> And you say "yes" to the doctor because you die at each instant.
>>
>> And you still care about the quality and seriousness of the doctor
>> because you care by altruism for the copy.
>>
>> With MEC we have indeed this at each instant ( through QM or not).
>>
>> But then, you will have to think about anything you do in the future
>> as an act of altruism. You take a cigarette because you care about  
>> the
>> satisfaction feeling of the "copy" who will smoke it, and you abandon
>> the cigarette because you care of the lungs of the copies of the  
>> future.
>>
>> Egoism as pure self-altruisme, why not? But then, assuming MEC, any
>> statement of any laws (physical, arithmetical, juridic, etc.)  
>> concerns
>> our copies, and this means that taking this point of view or not is
>> not relevant in the reasoning, we have still to derive the laws, be  
>> it
>> by altruism or egoism according to the interpretation of identity.
>>
>> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when
>> you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink
>> coffee.
>>
>> I think that if you put yourself in the place of the polycopies, none
>> will feel like that except a few exception. I mean the quasi- 
>> tautology
>> that none *feels* dying at each instant.  You have to meditate eight
>> hours per day during eight years or to eat or smoke something
>> (legal!), or to die, or perhaps to dream for PERHAPS get a feeling of
>> what dying could be, according to some.
>>
>> But your view is coherent and rather cool too, so let us continue the
>> UDA reasoning, by altruism for *all* our descendants and why not the
>> many others descendant to:)
>>
>> It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this
>> sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you
>> did'nt, you are the copy.
>>
>> Computability can be thought as a topological notion. MEC is the
>> assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in
>> teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self-
>> multiplication).
>>
>> (I know you are playing the role of the "time person skeptic").
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>
>
>
>
> -- 
> Abram Demski
> Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
> Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
> Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com
>
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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