On 30 Dec 2008, at 02:22, Kim Jones wrote:

> "I am good to go!"

I suspect this is not english :)

> Have teleported it to my screen...

You should print it and put it in your kitchen or toilet, and put a  
big red cross on each step you understand well,  so that your partner  
can see your progress. Well this is just basic self elementary  
encouragement tricks. Never mind.

>> For those who don't have it, and want follow: it is the PDF slide of
>> UDA[1 ... 8] in
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>> In Kim 2.1 You agree with MEC =>"I survive" through teleportation.  
>> All
>> right ? "MEC =>" means "Assuming MEC,"
>> It is the UDA step 1 of the slide. "The 1=3" on the right means the
>> first and third person points of view (figured by "1" and "2" with
>> points) are identical. (cf Kim has gone on Mars).
> Yes
>> Kim 2.2 A delay is introduced, with and without "you" knowing the
>> protocol. Imagine the reconstitutation machine on Mars did work but
>> with a delay of one month. It is a situation where the first person
>> experience remains unchanged (same account in the diary) where the
>> third person account notice a change: the delay. You agree with this?
> Yes. It would be hard to imagine how this would not be the case...

You are right. You will see that this first person non awareness of  
delays plays a key role in the way the physical laws will "logically  
emerge" from the numbers and their relations.

>> That the first person cannot be aware, without external clues, of the
>> presence and length of reconstitution delays? All right?
> Except by hindsight, after the event, when I notice (following
> reconst.) that I am one month younger now than my twin sister who is
> already on Mars

OK, but then I said "with no external clues". I see you understand  
(but not read what I say: no problem).

>> "Kim 2.3" was done through my reply to Abram. It is the self-
>> duplication thought experiment. I want do it as slowly as possible,
>> because it is a crucial step. So my first question, and second
>> question are:
>> 1) With a duplication you are scanned and annihilated, and then
>> reconstitute in two places at once. For example in two identical room
>> A and room B. . Do you agree that (MEC => I survive a duplication) ?
> Yes - this follows, given that I am Turing emulable down to the last
> atom of my being; I am a Universal Machine

OK. This seems obvious to me. Nevertheless some people have doubt at  
this stage, like if the two consciousness could act at a distance and  
annihilate each other. In that case, I have to come back to the "qua  
computatio reason" of the surviving in the comp teleportation  
experiment. But of course it *is* obvious, ... once grasped.

>> Put in another way, do you agree that if one survive teleportation,
>> then one can be said to survive in such a duplication.
> Or polyplication - you could spam every teleportation centre on Mars
> with copies of me. Each one is Kim, but Kim cannot know (before
> teleportation) which copy he will *feel* himself to be - assuming he
> KNOWS you are going to duplicate him and not simply transport him to
> one place (I choose here 3rd person language on purpose; at this point
> I cannot see how the 1 and 3 perspective might differ; I could equally
> have said "each one is me, but I cannot know (before teleportation)
> which copy I will *feel* myself to be - assuming I KNOW you are going
> to duplicate me and not simply transport me to one place.

Very good.

> It seems to me that what I believe is about to happen (based on what
> you tell me before I step into the teleporter) affects how I feel
> (beforehand). If you tell me I am going to two places, my diary will
> surely reflect my uncertainty about which place I will feel I am in
> afterward. It seems to me that you could not (at this or any point)
> tell me which of the two copies I will feel is me either.

You are right. We see that the MEC hypothesis, generally considered as  
imposing a strong determinacy in nature, introduces on the contrary a  
form of strong indeterminacy. Even a God, or whatever possible  
Omniscient Being, cannot predict to you, before a duplication (of you)  
experiment, where you will feel to be after. If he told you "you will  
feel to be the one in room A", the "Kim" in room A will say that such  
God was right, but the one in room B will know or believe that that  
God was wrong, and the point of MEC is that we have no reason to  
listen more to one Kim than to the other Kim. In particular the Kim of  
room A will not convince the Kim of room B, that "God" was right. No  
Kim will ever be able to convince its counterpart about any possible  
method of prediction for the particular future.
This does not mean that nothing can be predicted. You can predict that  
you will drink whisky, with certainty (given the protocol above, ah  
no, below, where whisky has been put in the two rooms).

> After the
> teleportation, the 1 and 3 perspectives separate, necessarily. Each
> copy will claim (with perfect validity) that he is Kim - so the 1st
> person uncertainty is clearly symptomatic of the indeterminacy of that
> point of view.


>> ... and 2) suppose that in both rooms I put, .... Hmmm... a glass of
>> you favorite whisky (OK?). In both rooms. What do you answer if I ask
>> you before that duplication experience, you knowing the protocol,
>> "Will you drink alcohol after the duplication?". What would you say
>> say?
> I will say "Yes, one of me will drink the whiskey after the
> experiment" - because the one who *feels* he is me will probably need
> a stiff drink after having his atoms annihilated and reconstituted. I
> could probably also, with a little wisdom, surmise that the one I do
> *not* feel I am may - with probability 1/2 - do the same.

OK, but I did put whisky in the two rooms. So you agree that, before  
the experiment, you know or bet you will drink whisky with probability  
one. OK? I mean, if *you* want to drink the whisky, both of the 3-you  
will drink it, so both of the 1-you will drink it, and you, before the  
experiment knows that. All right?

>> 2-variant): Same question with whisky in room A and gin in room B.
> Here I would answer that, depending on where I *find myself* following
> the teleportation, I will drink whiskey or I will not, given that gin
> makes me vomit. So, if you are asking me beforehand, I can only answer
> "I do not know at this stage."

OK. It is the same indeterminacy. You will drink whisky (and enjoy it)  
with "probability 1/2" (or credibility 1/2, we are using the term  
"probability" in an informal way).  You will drink gin with  
probability 1/2 (you will drink it because you are so nervous, and  
then you will vomit it ...).

> I've also printed out your 2004 thesis and am studying that as well. I
> hope I have given the impression that I understand up to here.

I did have that impression, but your next post put a slight doubt on  
that impression.
Perhaps your partner understands better! I comment it below.

> On 28/12/2008, at 12:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> With
>> Everett everything becomes clearer: nature does not collapse the  
>> wave,
>> and thus, does not provide any examples of a machine generating truly
>> random events. Randomness appears in the mind of the multiplied
>> observers, exactly like in the mechanical self-duplication  
>> experience.
>> That is why Everett and comp fits so well together.
> Here I feel I finally understand the kernel of comp. The outcome of
> any measurement is always subject to the 1 indeterminacy, which we
> read as "random"
> In fact "random" is itself a product of OUR unavoidable uncertainty,
> non? TRUE random would admit the white rabbits; like the dice
> disappearing after we throw them

Here, I would say that you anticipate a bit too much. At this stage we  
are still believing in some sort of "physical laws" (and later we will  
still believe in arithmetic and logic). Indeed we trust the doctor on  
the brain reconstitution, which would not be possible if all the  
interactions in the brain (which can be seen as a myriad of self- 
measurement did not have non random deterministic outcome.
That all form of randomness is a result of self-multiplication is a  
bit rather challenging too. In particular, if you throw a dice, there  
is no reason to believe, at this stage, that this event will entails a  
mutiplication by six. usually. Amusingly, if we shake the dice  
sufficiently so that the quantum Heisenberg unceratinties adds up,  
then, with Everett (that is without wave collapse) the throwing of the  
dice does mutiply you indeed. But the UDA reasoning does not, and  
cannot, use physics, above the need of a realistic decor.

>> Of course Everett could be wrong, and comp could be wrong, and
>> naturalism could be right: but it is up to the naturalist to say what
>> is the machine's atomic operation that a Turing machine cannot
>> complete. If it is the generation of a truly random event, and if  
>> this
>> is based on the wave collapse, then I can understand (but you will
>> have to solve all the problem raised by the collapse, you will have  
>> to
>> abandon the theory of relativity like Bohm and Bell suggested, etc.).
>> Or you say like Searle that "only special machine can think:
>> biological brain".
> If Searle (and Penrose) are right, then why not a simple biological
> brain transplant? Why bother with looking for "the right substitution
> level" at all in this case?
> Just pilfer a wet, messy brain from a road accident victim and shove
> it into your skull. But where would we now stand with respect to the
> indeterminacy?
> I asked my partner today whether she felt she would be the same person
> after receiving a biological brain transplant and she said "Of course
> not! I would now be the dead person whose brain I have inherited. Who
> I am is generated only by MY brain." Proves she is a materialist/
> physicalist, I guess. We all know people like this. Sigh.

Ah gosh Kim, be careful or add enough smileys when you do jokes. It is  
of course your partner who is right.
Assuming the neurophysiological evidences, your biological wet brain  
in your skull is the one responsible for your personal memories,  
character and identity. That is why we have to scan and copy brain (in  
the teleportation experiences) at a sufficiently fine grained level.
If I take your brain out of your skull, and put the brain of a pig in  
there: the pig survives, with your body. You die or disappear, in the  
usual clinical sense. I guess you are OK with this, I mean with this  
point, if not (re)read the 2.1 posts (or drink more coffee, I  
dunno ...).

When your partner said "Who I am is generated only by MY brain", she  
is not making necessarily a "materialist commitment" . her statement  
could as well be interpreted as a computationalist commitment: she  
*has* a brain. Tell her that, assuming MEC, she could have more than  
one brain, with backup of instantaneous past state.

> I then asked her if she would feel herself to be the same person after
> a digi-brain transplant. She responded that this was maybe possible,
> but she felt dubious about it.
> Would there in fact be any difference? After all, we are assuming that
> wet, messy brains and digi-brains are equivalent, all things  
> considered?

With MEC (and the neurophysiological evidences) Wet-brain and digi- 
brain are equivalent in their potentialities (and are indeed  
equivalent with any universal machine). But once "programmed", by  
relative life events or by copy or whatever, they are no more  
identical and differentiates through memories and experiences. Nor is  
your computer hard disk identical with mine, despite they are both  
digi-brain, with similar capacities.

I am talking for the short terms, the everyday life prediction, which  
the UDA will show that they have to be explained or re-explained if we  
assume MEC.
What you say could be interpreted again in a larger sense, at another  
level (once you identify yourself with the universal machine: then  
indeed you survive even with a pig brain substitution, but not in a  
useful way to derive the physical laws. It concerns the *very* long  
run only.

Messy brains, digi-brains, whatever- brains, what makes us is what is  
written there. You would not be so happy if we substitute our hard  
disks, all right?

>> In that case we have to suppose something very
>> special about the brain: it generates consciousness.
> This made me laugh out loud. I just love it when you say things like
> this. Perhaps we must give up on the notion that personhood has
> anything at all to do with a brain?

I'm afraid I must a bit temper your enthusiasm. Without my brain and  
my computer, it would be hard for me to answer your post. What will  
happens, is that MEC will show that the brain is not responsible for  
the existence of your consciousness, it is needed only to entangle  
your computations (going through to your states of mind) with mine, so  
that we can share a conversation, indeed an history (or a sheaf of  
similar histories). OK?

>> But this is just
>> a blocking argument: it could be interesting only if it points on
>> something special in the brain that a digital machine cannot imitate.
>> Without such specification it is just equivalent with the  
>> *assumption*
>> that the brain is not a digital machine.
> Enter the soul, enter religion - enter the supernatural. Hummmph!!

Soul? Of course it all depends on the sense of the words. I like to  
identify or define the 3-soul by the coded body/brain or its backup,  
and the 1-soul, by the owner of that code. The immaterial one who  
choose a new body every morning and evening (if you remember 2.1).

Religion? Well, that could be more problematical indeed, like  
ideologies or anything using long term moral authoritative normative  
arguments (full of hidden or not logical errors usually).

Supernatural, well "natural" is already too much magical for me  
(unless it is for natural numbers of course ;).

Hummmph?? (well this means the same everywhere I guess, even for the  

Soon 2.4, 2.5, 2.6. Which correspond to UDA steps 4, 5, 6 on the slide  
and in the 2004 paper.

No need of more math than we have already use for going to 2.6 included.

Then for 2.7; either you take my word for some key point, and then 2.7  
can be made easily (as easily as the preceding steps), or, (as I  
secretly hope) you don't take my word and ask for the true  
understanding of the seventh step, but then we have to open the gate  
of mathematics.
What is that point? It is the point of the existence of the universal  
machine. This has to be seen as:
- a theorem in mathematical computer science
- a schema of theorems in mathematical computer science
- a thesis overlapping mathematics and philosophy
To understand this, it is useful to understand the explosive "many  
incompleteness" which is the price that the universal machine has to  
pay for that universality. Assuming the MEC hypothesis, it is a big  
price *we* have to pay ...

2.7 eliminates all the trace of "science-fiction" of the preceding  
steps, and is needed to understand that the UD Argument is an  
eliminative argument, that is a proof, up to a remaining "big"  
hypothesis: the existence of a "concrete" universal dovetailing.

Then 2.8, UDA 8, or the MGA (Movie Graph Argument)  eliminates that  
remaining "big" hypothesis, and completes the reversal. Darwin has to  
be extended to the physical laws, they evolve through an arithmetical  
self-reflection "process".

Then 3? (cf the plan). It will depend of the appetite. UDA is enough  
to understand the reduction of physics to the theology of numbers. 3  
is really the "UDA for the dummies", where the dummy person here *is*  
the (chatty) universal machine who knows she is universal.
3 is really far simpler that the UDA, given that for 3 we really  
presuppose only the understanding of three very elementary axioms of  
arithmetic. Unfortunately, by this very token, by the fact that the  
pure virgin umprogrammed universal machine is so dummy, the UDA  
becomes far longer, and mathematics get only more sophisticated,  
because  we have to shorten the conversation. It happens that Gödel,  
Löb, Solovay and others have already make the hard part of that  
shortening. Take it easy, one step at a time.




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