On 04 Jan 2009, at 03:09, Stephen Paul King wrote:

> Hi Günther,
>    Nice post! Coments soon.
>    Speaking of Svozil's work, please see: Cristian S. Calude, Peter H.
> Hertling and Karl Svozil, ``Embedding Quantum Universes in Classical  
> Ones'',
> Foundations of Physics 29(3), 349-390 (1999) [abstract], [CrossRef
> DOI:10.1023/A:1018862730956], [pdf], [pdf], [tex], [ps].

Nice work. It is in the line of the beautiful theorem of Kochen and  

>    How can we derive quantum logics from purely integer (or even real
> number) based logics? This paper seems to yeild a no-go theorem!

And this confirms the MEC prediction (or re-prediction) that the logic  
of the physical reality cannot be boolean.
I recall you that the material hypostases, when interpreted in  
arithmetic, gives quantum like logics. There is no reason to suppose  
they can be embedded in Boolean logics. The no-go theorems shows that  
quantum logic cannot be embedded in classical logic in observable  
value preserving way.
Such no go-theorems cannot be applied to the AUDA arithmetical  
quantization, which concerns the way self-observing machine have to  
structure the comp physical reality. Remember the result by  
Goldblatt(*) 1974: there is a boolean way to interpret "epistemically"  
quantum logic (by the modal logic B). The arithmetical quantization,  
which captures the first person (plural) points of view, gives a modal  
logic B (without necessitation rule). It would be a nice research  
project to show that this extends the no-go theorems to the comp  
physical quantum logics. This would confirm the highly non boolean  
(and non Aristotelian) nature of matter, or appearance of matter.

The mechanist quantum logic is not derived from numbers, but from  
numbers personal points ov view: what numbers can observe and share  
when they observe themselves, and this with a very general notion of  
It is like the MWI, the most weird is the quantum world, the more we  
can believe that comp is correct, given that comp entails a rather  
highly non classical view of the physical reality.

All right? More generally and perhaps more simply  the no-go theorems  
forbid a classical reality, it does not forbid a classical *theory*  
about a non classical reality. The (meta)logic of quantum mechanics  
itself is classical. If you believed that the non go theorems is a  
problem for comp, it means that you could be confusing levels with  
metalevels. All right?



PS Kim, Günther, I will comment your posts with some details asap, but  
I have some new year activities ...

(*) Goldblatt, R. I. (1974). Semantic Analysis of Orthologic. Journal  
of Philosophical Logic, 3:19-35. Also in Goldblatt, R. I. (1993).  
Mathematics of Modality. CSLI Lectures Notes, Stanford California,  
page 81-97.

> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Günther Greindl" <guenther.grei...@gmail.com>
> To: <everything-l...@googlegroups.com>
> Sent: Saturday, January 03, 2009 5:53 PM
> Subject: Re: Boltzmann Brains, consciousness and the arrow of time
> Hi Bruno,
> first of all thanks for the long answer, and yes, it was very helpful.
> You described the production of all reals with a very vivid imagery;  
> it
> showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the  
> limit_
> there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to also
> take into account infinite delay, we must take this limit into account
> and have infinite histories going through a "state" (do I understand  
> you
> correctly?).
> As to the interacting programs: do you consider them purely because  
> they
> are part of UD or do you think this is a possible way to share  
> histories?
> (I am interested in this because I find COMP very convincing, though I
> am still a bit worried about solipsism).
> I am also preparing a few thoughts (in a later post, but see hints
> below) on how consciousness might supervene on large parts of past
> causal histories, thereby also steering a bit away from solipsism
> (arguing via the concept of external realism from analytic philosophy,
> summarized by Putnam's "meaning is not in the head").
> I also have another question (related to the above issue of  
> solipsism):
> We have considered COMP and MAT and seen that the two are not really
> compatible.
> But you also say that with COMP, the universe itself is not computable
> (I understand why, and I agree with your reasoning as you have  
> presented
> it).
> But I have one "worry": what if the subsitution level is "at the  
> bottom"
>  of the universe - (for a moment drawing on materialist intuitions,  
> the
> universe in the "normal" sense and not considering infinite histories
> for the moment).
> If the universe is a computation, then also an individual in the
> universe is part of this computation. But this individual can't be
> "duplicated" because of the quantum no-cloning theorem (that is what I
> mean with "at the bottom" - not above the quantum level).
> Svozil for instance refers in a number of papers to the work of Moore
> and Finkelstein that show, assuming we have an automaton, we would
> witness complementarity.
> http://tph.tuwien.ac.at/~svozil/publ/publ.html
> (see for instance these overview papers:
> Svozil, K. ``How real are virtual realities, how virtual is reality?  
> The
> constructive re-interpretation of physical undecidability'',  
> Complexity,
> 1, 43-54 (1996).
> Svozil, K. Computational Universes Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2005,  
> 25,
> 845-859
> Svozil, K. Physical Unknowables physics/0701163, 2007)
> The results of course would also apply if we were "solipsist"  
> automatons
> and "the whole" not (so the arguments are quite compatible with  
> varying
> versions of machine conception (universe/person) ).
> I am just saying that we can't know if we are "separable" from the  
> universe.
> To state it differently (and to make the connection with  
> complementarity
> and duplication):
> If we assume the whole universe to be an automaton, also it's
> inhabitants would be "mechanical" =effectively computable of course -
> but maybe they could then not be duplicated, because, when person A  
> were
> trying to make a scan of the properties of person B, the universe as a
> whole would move into different states and make complementary
> observables - which _could_ be necessary for a duplication -  
> unavailable.
> This may only work if consciousness supervenes not on "isolated"
> computations, but only if it is embedded in computations constructing
> whole universes - but then again, we can't exclude this a priori.
> And we would still have to consider many worlds, but these would then
> indeed be _worlds_ and not only OMs with incoming/outgoing histories  
> (of
> course it would still seem this way from the concrete OM, but with
> greatly reduced danger of white rabbits) - the laws of physics would  
> not
> emerge for OM's stranded in the UD deployment but for OM's embedded
> already in highly structured computational environments - we would  
> only
> have to take into account duplications of OM's where also whole
> universes are duplicated.
> So, what I am getting at, wouldn't you have to modify your argument -
> the reversal physics/machine psychology - insofar that not only a
> substitution level exists (COMP), but that this level is "separable"
> from a possible universe-machine (the possibility of which we can't
> exclude at the beginning of the argument). A kind of qualified COMP,  
> Of course, the variant where the whole universe is necessary for
> duplication would still be machine psychology, but at a different  
> level
> - at the universe level (classical sense again) and not at the level  
> of
> everday conception of persons. Maybe COMP with the assumption that
> consciousness needs whole universes to supervene on (I don't mean  
> that a
> universe is conscious; persons, brains would be conscious, but they
> would need the surrounding computations supplied by the universe to
> provide "meaning") is even preferable to the view that one can  
> duplicate
> a person from _within_ a universe (because of the white rabbit  
> problem).
> Reading through my post above again, I believe that your COMP argument
> also works with the above conception.
> QCOMP and UNIVERSE-COMP would just be different as to what would be
> possible for us in _this_ universe: for instance, QCOMP would allow
> mind-uploading and teleportation and other such things in _this
> universe_ (materialist intuition again); while UNIVERSE-COMP would  
> only
> allow this in Platonia, in the Universal deployment, which is
> inaccessible for manipulation for us inhabitants of the rather small
> (considered against Platonia) visible universe.
> Best Wishes,
> Günther
> >


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