On 03 Jan 2009, at 12:59, Kim Jones wrote:

> Bruno,
> In this step, one of me experiences (or actually does not experience)
> the delay prior to reconstitution. In Step 2, it was proven to me that
> I cannot know that any extra time (other than the 4 minutes necessary
> transmission interval) has elapsed between my annihilation and
> reconstitution on Mars. The same thing will now happen to one of "me"
> in the duplication-plus-delay in Step 4. Essentially, Step 4 is
> identical to Step 2 with duplication as the only added feature. We
> cannot attribute a measure to my 1-pov in either step because the
> outcome is truly random.

It is because an event can be random or probabilistic that we have to  
put a measure on it (like a distribution of probabilities, or of  

Example: the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random  
experience with a probability "measure" HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2.

I will ask you questions, if you don't mind. I prefer to ask question  
and illustrate the use of the word in place of teaching you the  
probability theory.

- Do you agree that if you throw a coin, you have a probability of 1/2  
to get HEAD?
- Do you agree that if you throw a dice, you have a probability of 1/6  
to get "six"?
- Do you agree that if you play lottery, you will win the biggest  
price with a probability like 1/<big number>

In most discrete case, we can infer equivalence of the elementary  
events on the base of symmetry (like in the old Pascal probability  

> Here I would merely like to ask, random to whom?

Fair enough. In all situation which will interest us: it means "random  
for the subject who performs the (first person) experience".
You are the one throwing the dice? Then it will be random for you  
(despite it will be random for your friend too, but perhaps not for  

> Doesn't random mean
> that no conscious mind (mine or yours) can see the determinism behind
> it?

I could agree, although it is not necessary to dig on such detailed  
analysis, imo.

> We are tempted to say "probability 1/2" but that is only a comp-
> style "bet".

I am not sure I understand. There is just one comp bet: the "yes  
doctor", which we can be paraphrased in step 1by "I survive (or I go  
to Mars) with probability 1". (and idem in step 2)
But in step 3, ASSUMING comp, it is hard for me to see any difference  
with the throwing of a coin, *for the subject of the experience*.

Suppose I propose the following two type of experiences/experiments.  
The ROOM ZERO and the ROOM ONE are NOT distinguishable from inside  
(but are of course distinguishable from outside). In particular, to  
make things 100% clear later, i add in both room a close box with a  
bottle of whisky inside. And you know this fact about the rooms.

Type 1 experience: I make you asleep, then I throw a coin, if the  
outcome is HEAD I put you in the ROOM ZERO, if I get TAIL, I put you  
in the ROOM ONE. In the room, I wake you up, and I ask you to evaluate  
the chance of finding whisky in the box, and then the chance  
(probability) of being in room ZERO.

Type 2 experience: I make you asleep, then I scan you and annihilate  
you, and I reconstitute you in both rooms ZERO and ONE.  I wake you up  
in both room. In both rooms, you have to evaluate the chance  
(probability) of being in room ZERO or ONE,  and the chance of
finding whisky in the box.

 From the first person points of view, sequences of such experience  
will seem equivalent, except for the "Harry Potter" or "white rabbit"  
youS, which will believe in special computable sequences. OK?

Now the question can be asked BEFORE you undergo the experience. You  
can predict you will have whisky with probability 1. So you can  
predict that you will NOT know in which room you are with probability  
one. So you can predict with certainty that you *will be* uncertain of  
which room you are. So you are now not knowing in which room you will  
be. So the 1/2 can be lifted in your past. You could not have known!  
(This I sum up by the drawing: Y = II, bifurcation of "futures"  
differentiates the "pasts")

> You explained on this in Step 2:
> "We see that the MEC hypothesis, generally considered as imposing a
> strong determinacy in nature, introduces on the contrary a form of
> strong indeterminacy. Even a God, or whatever possible Omniscient
> Being, cannot predict to you, before a duplication (of you)
> experiment, where you will feel to be after. If he told you "you will
> feel to be the one in room A", the "Kim" in room A will say that such
> God was right, but the one in room B will know or believe that that
> God was wrong, and the point of MEC is that we have no reason to
> listen more to one Kim than to the other Kim. In particular the Kim of
> room A will not convince the Kim of room B, that "God" was right. No
> Kim will ever be able to convince its counterpart about any possible
> method of prediction for the particular future.
> I want to grok this more. At this stage I can only believe you.

No, please, you should'nt. Hope the explanation above has clarified.  
Take your time, ask any question.

> I have
> always felt (with Einstein) that reality is fundamentally
> deterministic, even if we have to point to stochastic features along
> the way.

I follow Einstein. Like the Everettian. Everett provide an  
interpretation of QM where reality is fundamentally deterministic,  
yet, shows that the deterministic main equation of QM, SWE, explains  
why observers, from their point of view, met indeterminacies, and how  
they can put measure on them and do the usual quantum probability  
calculus. In a nutshell: the observation of a quantum superposition is  
seen as a self-duplication experience, or a differentiation of a  

> I know you will be able to debunk this easily and to my (and
> Einstein's) satisfaction.

 From what Einstein said in the EPR paper, and from the extreme  
confirmation of QM which has continued, I would think that Einstein  
would have adopted Everett, and then eventually comp. It is the same  
philosophy. Einstein missed comp by its "conventionalist math"  
blindness perhaps, togethet with the fact that he was not interested  
in computer science.

> Maybe dwell a little on this

OK. Tell me if you get the point of above. Throwing a coin, and self- 
duplication are identical first person experiences.
You have to really do the thought experiences.
If I duplicate you in room 1 and 2, with repetition (iteratively), you  
could predict that you will be the one with the diary 111111111...,
But all your doppelganger (the 1011100010..., the 0000000...) will  
know they were wrong. The "111111111..." *is* the first person white  
rabbit experience, that we should not, in this protocol, take into  

> and then move
> on to Step 5 where you manage to email me to me.

Hmmm... It is just a teleportation without annihilation of the  
original. I scan you on earth, and then I send the info on Mars where  
you are reconstituted. the question is what is the probability that  
you will find yourself on Mars, what is the probability you stay on  
Earth. from you first person point of view you will not live both. OK?  
It is really a duplication, with a zero delay on one of its branch.

> This is truly scary
> because here I meet "myself". I recall with horror what Angier did
> about his double in "The Prestige"...
> Actually, I believe I have already met my double.

Well, yes, you should already in step 3 ! In all duplication you can  
meet your doppelganger. It is the main relationship between the  
prestige and comp: self-duplication. It is the key basic construction  
of the UDA and AUDA. I got all this by looking at amoeba, paramecium,  
Euglena, and even Bacteria. I am inspired by "real" biology at the  
start. I have discovered computer science in the jacob and Monod paper  
on the Operon Lactose (a genetic sugar regulation system in the  
bacteria Escherichia Coli). My first models of self-replication where  
carbon based until i discover Gödel's proof which makes me suspect  
that carbon has nothing to do with the key life principles.

> Once, a man stopped
> outside my house and stroked my cat, which was on the verandah. I
> greeted him and he told me that he had a cat that looked exactly like
> my cat and that it was his dearest and most cherished friend (I feel
> much the same way about my cat). I then asked him what name he had
> given his cat. He told me "Cindy Bingy". I think my mouth must have
> fallen open in shock because that is the name of my cat too. From
> memory, the man looked rather like me as well. He then walked off
> while I stood there wondering about the improbability of all this (I
> cannot remember whether cannabis was in my system at the time)

So I will not try to interpret this :)

Tell me if you agree that self-duplication entails, from the first  
point of view of the person(s) a feeling of uncertainty on their first  
person future, and, when knowing the protocol, some means to evaluate  
their chance. I can use other thought experiences, like with the movie  
which I can explain in more details (perhaps the number  
2^(16180*10000)*(60*90)*24 of KIM 2.3 is not easy for you(*).



(*) I repeat there (quote from my post to Abram and you: KIM 2.3:

  don't want to give a definition of what is a normal machine, just
that you feel the point.

Let me give you another illustration which exploits the freedom of
thought a bit more. Indeed, let me duplicate you, or better,
polyplicate you into 2^(16180*10000)*(60*90)*24.

I explain. I multiply you by 2^(16180*10000) in front of a
(16180*10000) pixels screen, with each possible images (black and
white) on it.
And I reiterate every 1/24 of a second that multiplication, and this
during 90 minutes, that is 90*60 seconds.

What do you predict you will feel, as personal, subjective, first
person experience. What do you think is more probable, among:

I will feel seeing a white screen
I will feel seeing a black screen
I will feel seeing a movie
I will feel seeing a good movie
I will feel seeing "2001 Space Odyssey"
I will feel seeing "2001 Space Odyssey" with the subtitle of Caligula
I will feel seeing a random-noise-movie (what you see on TV when there
is no emission).

Of course there is a sense to say: I will see all possible movies, but
this means you are talking about yourself at the third person point of
view, and here what is asked, is what do you expect to experience or
live in your future if you are invited to practice it. By MEC, you
survive, and any of your first person experience is unique, on which
of the above you would bet? What bet will you do if I tell you that I
will accompany you in the multiplication. And send you to hell if your
bet is wrong. What bet you will do if you want to optimize the chance
of not going to hell?

The rest of the UDA reasoning shows that "this" thought experience
happens all the time in arithmetic, but the "probabilities", which
eventually could be credibilities or other uncertainty measure, are
constrained by computer science/number theory. It extends the notion
of normality from the protocol above to the whole Universal Deployment
(which I will (re)define in KIM 3).

Exercise: define the notion of "normal first person experience" for
machine in the protocol above. With the UD protocol, things are so
much complex that I will interview the Universal Machine directly to
provide hints ...


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